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The dissertation consists of three Chapters.  I consider New Keynesian models which 
involve tradeoffs between output gap and inflation variances.  Such policy strategy is often 
referred to as flexible inflation targeting rules (e.g., Lars Svensson 2011, pp.1238-95).  Taylor 
rules, in general, have the symbolic expression 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡, where 𝑖𝑡 is the 
nominal interest rate at period t, 𝑥𝑡 is the target variable output gap at period t, 𝜋𝑡 is the target 
variable inflation rate at period t, 𝑔𝑡 is realized shock to output gap at period t, and 𝜑𝑥, 𝜑𝜋 and 
𝜑𝑔 are coefficients.  This three-term Taylor rule is the most efficient Taylor rule in terms of the 
social welfare loss measurement (i.e., the minimized social welfare loss involved with the three-
term Taylor rule is the smallest value when we compare it with the minimized social welfare loss 
involved with a one-term Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡) or a two-term Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 +
𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡).)  Thus, the three-term Taylor rule is used as the benchmark for comparing the 
performance of Taylor rules in the dissertation.   
Chapter 1 argues that the dynamic interpretation most authors have put on the “stability 
and uniqueness” (determinacy) condition of the new Keynesian monetary policy model is 
inappropriate.  Literatures authors maintain a belief when monetary policy is operating through a 
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Taylor rule, the model stability and uniqueness requires the real interest rate move in the same 
direction as inflation (Taylor Principle).  This chapter shows the determinacy condition does not 
necessarily require the Taylor Principle to hold.  The Taylor Principle and the determinacy 
condition are two different kettles of fish.   
Although the three-term Taylor rule is applied in Chapter 1, some people may object or 
think that it is impractical or “unrealistic” to expect the central bank (“the Fed”) bases a rule on a 
shock term �𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡�.  Thus, in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, I examine two-term (“simple”) Taylor 
rules which do not have 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡 term—i.e., 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡.   
Chapter 2 is a study of the linear relationship of the coefficients 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in Taylor rules, 
which 𝜑𝑥 is the coefficient to the target variable output gap (𝑥𝑡) and 𝜑𝜋 is the coefficient to the 
target variable inflation rate (𝜋𝑡).  Furthermore, since I use only 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 in Taylor rules instead 
of using 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 (i.e., the difference between price levels in two periods) in Taylor 
rules, the Taylor rules do not cause optimal inertia.  In other words, the Fed has once-and-for-all 
response to the new development in either 𝑥𝑡 or 𝜋𝑡, or both.  Such new developments are either 
from realized output gap shocks or inflation rate shocks or both.  The monetary policy objective 
function is then treated as a period quadratic social welfare loss function for two target variables 
and their coefficients because the solution expectation for all periods is the same as the solution 
for period t.  The optimal policy implies that, especially, the coefficients  𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 must 
produce minimum social welfare loss to the economy when the Fed’s monetary policy target is 
based on the tradeoffs between two target variables inflation rate 𝜋𝑡 (not price levels) and output 
gap 𝑥𝑡.  For those policy-rate paths (expressed by Taylor rules) which the minimum social 
welfare losses are guaranteed, I use the term optimal Taylor rules, and for those coefficient 
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values satisfied this purpose, I called them optimal coefficients or optimal linear relationship 
among those coefficients.  The natural optimum Taylor rule, as pointed out by Woodford (2001), 
would have the 𝜑𝑔 term (= 𝜎), but for the reason in the previous paragraph, I only examine the 
case of a simpler Taylor rule, 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥t + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 (hereafter this Taylor rule is called the simple 
Taylor rule or the simple TR), when the rule is specified as the optimal interest rate rule for 
governing the optimal paths of output gap and inflation rate.  The global-type solutions with 
“optimal inertia” will not be considered in all chapters.      
The first part of Chapter 2 develops an approach to obtain the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 
𝜑𝜋 which is the first order condition for minimum social welfare loss, 𝐿 =
1
2
𝐸[𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2], where 
L denotes social welfare loss, E is the expectational operator and 𝛤 is the weights on output gap.   
The second part of Chapter 2 is the discussion of two properties of the linear relationship 
of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 that are observed by comparing with the three-term Taylor: (a) the linear 
relationship is the same for governing the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 whether g-shocks are 
nullified by containing 𝜑g = 𝜎 in the baseline new Keynesian model or not; (b) the limit of the 
social welfare loss containing the simple Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡) is at the minimum 
when the values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are very big (or approaching infinity), and such minimum is the 
same as the social welfare loss containing the three-term Taylor rule.  This implies the three-term 
Taylor rule with 𝜑𝑔(= 𝜎) suggested by Woodford (2001), whose model has different setup but it 
works out with the same result, is more efficient than the simple (two-term) Taylor rule.  
In Chapter 3, using the method developed from and the two properties discovered in 
Chapter 2, I propose a combination monetary policy rule when the Fed sets the interest rate 
before observing current variables of output gap (𝑥𝑡) and inflation (𝜋𝑡).  The missing information 
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is 𝜀𝑡 in 𝑥𝑡 equation—i.e., 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 where 𝜀𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁 (0,𝜎𝜀2), and 𝜂𝑡 in 𝜋𝑡 equation—i.e., 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 where 𝜂𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁 �0,𝜎𝜂2�.  Thus, the Fed cannot adjust their interest rate for 
those shocks because the Fed cannot observe 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡.  On the other hand, the information of 
money is immediately available to the Fed when I use a model as abstract representation of the 
Fed’s observation of money surprise, so the Fed can use signals about money to adjust their 
interest rate.  My model of the Fed’s operation on how they observe money surprise is a 
simplified model for making a theoretical point, not for the purpose of improving what the Fed is 
actually doing.  The combination policy of a Taylor rule and money signal can improve the 
social welfare loss when the Fed sets their monetary policy with unobservable shocks.  Chapter 3 
uses an inverted version of Poole’s (1970) combination policy analysis and shows that the social 
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1 THE  TAYLOR  PRINCIPLE  AND  TAYLOR  RULE:  TWO  
DIFFERENT  KETTLES  OF  FISH 






















In recent literature in monetary theory it is nearly universal to specify monetary 
policy as operating through a Taylor rule and to interpret the well-known “stability and 
uniqueness” (determinacy) condition as meaning that the Taylor rule makes the real 
interest rate move in the same direction as inflation (Taylor Principle). 
We first argue that the dynamic interpretation most authors have put on the NKM 
determinacy condition is inappropriate.  Second, we show the standard NKM 
determinacy condition does not necessarily require the Taylor Principle to hold.  The 




In recent years a great deal of attention among monetary economists has been focused on the 
issue of uniqueness, stability and/or “determinacy” in macroeconomic models, particular in the 
New Keynesian Model (NKM).  Modeling in NKM usually represents monetary policy as 
following a Taylor rule, and the parameters of the Taylor rule must meet certain “determinacy 
conditions” which may be necessary to rule out both “sunspots” and explosive solutions.  At 
least since the widely-cited article by Woodford (2001) there has been a consensus that the 
determinacy condition in these models is essentially a restatement of the Taylor Principle – the 
policy rule must guarantee that real interest rates will move in the same direction as inflation.  
We beg to differ with this line of reasoning, at least within the context of the NKM. 
Our argument is as follows.  “Backward-looking” models (such as that by Taylor (1999) 
himself) indeed require the Taylor Principle to hold for “stability” – meaning here where 
projected paths eventually approach long-run or steady-state solutions of the endogenous 
variables.  But one should avoid conflating the Taylor Principle with the determinacy condition 
in the forward-looking NKM.  The determinacy condition in NKM, when met, assures us that the 
model’s solution is unique.  The dynamics are “stable” in the above sense by construction (all 
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shocks are AR(1)).  If the determinacy condition is not met, the solution is “immediately 
explosive” (no finite solution exists) or may result in non-explosive sunspot solutions.1  
To illustrate our point, we begin by showing how the two concepts apply in simple, 
univariate backward- and forward-looking models.  Since many readers will be familiar with the 
points in the univariate models, we relegate this to Appendix 1.8.1.  Next and directly in the text, 
we turn to two representative bivariate (inflation and output gap) backward- and forward-looking 
models.  The backward-looking model is Taylor’s (1999) model; the forward-looking model is 
the baseline NKM as exposited by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2001, 2003) and 
others.  As a kind of coup de grace to the proposition that determinacy means Taylor Principle, 
we produce two examples of solutions where the determinacy condition is met in the baseline 
NKM with Taylor rule, but in which real interest rates move in the opposite direction of inflation. 
1.2 The Backward-Looking Taylor (1999) 
We start with the bivariate backward-looking model by Taylor (1999): 
(1) 𝑥𝑡 = −𝛽(𝑖𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 − 𝑟) + 𝑔𝑡 
(2) 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡 
(3) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑0 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 
                                                 
1 This paper does not analyze “sunspot” solutions.  For sunspot we refer readers to Chiappori and Guesnerie (1991), 
Lubik and Schorfheide (2002), Evans and McGough (2005) and Chadha and Corrado (2006).  These are rational 
solutions that reflect certain arbitrary and “non-fundamental” disturbances to expectations which produce self-
fulfilling and non-explosive solutions when the mathematical determinacy conditions are not met.  When the 
determinacy conditions are met, the effect is to rule out (in some cases “cancel out”) the effects of the sunspots.  Our 
focus will be on whether meeting the determinacy conditions has dynamic implications apart from ruling out 
sunspots and/or being instantly explosive.  We will argue that determinacy conditions do not have such implications 
for the baseline New Keynesian Model, notwithstanding widespread claims they do. 
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where x represent the output gap in logs; π represents the inflation rate; 𝑖 represents the short 
term nominal interest rate.  𝑔 and  𝑢 represent (independent and not auto-correlated) shocks with 
zero mean.  The model parameters 𝛼 and 𝛽 are positive.  r  represents the natural rate of interest.  
𝜑0,𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥  are the policy parameters of the Taylor rule. 
The solution path of inflation can be written as: 







𝑠=1 ,   𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑛 
where the subscript t denotes time and Λ = α𝛽(1−𝜑𝜋)+(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥)
1+𝛽𝜑𝑥
.  The key parameter is Λ, which if 
inside the unit circle will mean that projections of  𝜋𝑡+𝑠 will eventually approach the model’s 
steady-state value (𝜑0−𝑟
1−𝜑𝜋
) – hence, the model is “stable” in the sense Taylor intended.  If Λ lies 
outside the unit circle the model’s projections will depart continuously from steady-state values; 
if Λ lies on the unit circle the model’s projection will approach a value that differs from the 
steady-state value.  In these cases the model is “unstable” in the Taylor sense, though not 
“explosive” in the immediate sense.  Each period’s projection is well-defined. 
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Since Λ = 1 + α𝛽(1−𝜑𝜋)
1+𝛽𝜑𝑥
  , the Taylor stability condition can be simplified to 1 < 𝜑𝜋 < 1 +
2(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥)
𝛼𝛽
. 2  This establishes the Taylor Principle and its role in this model.  Taylor (1999) and 
Cochrane (2011) in his description of the Taylor (1999) model neglect the upper bound required 
on 𝜑𝜋, emphasizing only the requirement that 𝜑𝜋 > 1 for Taylor stability.3 
1.3 The Forward-Looking  NKM Model: Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) 
Now while the Taylor Principle governs whether a backward-looking model like Taylor’s above 
will be “stable” in terms of tending toward steady-state, there is no similar implication for 
forward-looking models.  To illustrate this point, we turn to the bivariate forward-looking model 
of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999, henceforth CGG(1999)).  Their baseline NKM consists of the 
familiar equations for the output gap (“IS”) and inflation (“Phillips curve”): 
(5) 𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1] −
1
𝜎
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1]) + 𝑔𝑡 
(6) 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] + 𝑢𝑡 
                                                 
2 −1 < Λ < 1, so −1 < 1 + α𝛽(1−𝜑𝜋)
1+𝛽𝜑𝑥
< 1 
                              −2 < α𝛽(1−𝜑𝜋)
1+𝛽𝜑𝑥
< 0.   
If 1 + 𝛽𝜑𝑥 > 1:                 −2(1 + 𝛽𝜑𝑥) < α𝛽(1 − 𝜑𝜋) < 0.  
If  α𝛽 > 0:                          −2(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥)
α𝛽
< 1 − 𝜑𝜋 < 0 












3 This does not seem to be a particularly important omission, since the Fed is presumably free to increase 𝜑𝑥  as 
needed to maintain 1 + 2(1+𝛽𝜑𝑥)
𝛼𝛽
> 𝜑𝜋  so as to prevent Taylor “instability.” 
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where x again represents output gap in logs; 𝜋  represents inflation (log-deviation from steady-
state); and i represents the nominal interest rate (deviation from steady-state); 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is a 
discount factor; 𝑘 > 0 is the Phillips curve parameter reflecting the degree of price flexibility 
(higher means more), and 𝜎 > 0 is the consumption-elasticity of utility. 𝑔𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 are shocks of 
AR(1) form: 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 (0 < 𝜆 < 1) and 𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡  (0 < 𝜌 < 1). 
This model needs to be closed by one of two means.  CGG (1999, p.1668) employed, in 
their wording, a welfare measure in the form of a quadratic loss function 
(7) 𝑊 = −1
2
� 𝛽𝑠∞𝑠=0 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+𝑠
2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡+𝑠2 ] 
where Γ  is a relative weight on preferences for the output gap (x) relative to inflation (𝜋).  This 
provides a first order condition constraint which, together with (5) and (6), permits the derivation 
of optimal paths for the endogenous variables.  The optimal paths themselves do not address the 
determinacy issue, but it is possible to derive a monetary policy rule (which usually but not 
necessarily means a Taylor rule) that is consistent with the optimal paths.  Once the rule is 
imposed it is possible to set conditions for determinacy for this rule.  More details are provided 
in Appendix 1.8.1. 
More generally, a monetary policy rule (again usually a Taylor rule) can simply be added 
to (5) and (6) so that the endogenous variables depend on the parameters of the rule.  These 




1.4 Determinacy with the Taylor Rule 
Let the particular Taylor rule be written as 
(8) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡 
which includes no intercept (the model is derived as log-linearized deviations from steady-state) 
and contains a 𝜑𝑔 which can be used to offset 𝑔𝑡 shocks.4  Putting (8) into (5) and (6), the model 
can be written in the matrix form 𝐌𝐭 = 𝐀𝐌𝐭+𝟏 + 𝐞𝐭, where 𝐌𝐭′ = [𝑥𝑡 𝜋𝑡], 𝐌𝐭+𝟏′ =
[𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1] 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1]] , A is the two-by-two coefficient matrix and e is a vector of exogenous 
shock terms.  The solution of the model will be linear in 𝑢𝑡 and 𝑔𝑡.  Bullard and Mitra 
(2002(2000)) showed that determinacy of this model requires that the eigenvalues of A lie within 
the unit circle, which in turn requires 
(9) 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0. 
It turns out that in the general solutions, for any set of 𝜑’s the first order conditions’ still 
make 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 proportional; therefore, the optimal ratio of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 can be replaced by any 
arbitrary values R depends on which combination of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 we pick.5 
 
                                                 
4 The optimal Taylor rule, as pointed out by Woodford (2001) would have 𝜑𝑔 term (= 𝜎), but some people may 
object or think that it is impractical or “unrealistic” to expect the Fed bases a rule on a shock term.  In chapter 2 and 
chapter 3, I examine the “simple Taylor Rule” which does not have that term.   
5 In other words, any set of 𝜑’s suggests a particular 𝛤 and other coefficients.  The optimal set of 𝜑’s of course will 
be obtained only if we use the “true” 𝛤.  The general solution of course does not in itself reveal the true 𝛤.  
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1.5 Two Examples Having Unique Solutions But Still Violate the Taylor 
Principle 
The Taylor Principle is not necessary for a forward-looking model to have uniqueness.  The 
following examples show that using Taylor Principle as the economic reasoning for the 
uniqueness of the forward-looking model is inappropriate. 
An Example for u-shock Only 
For this case, we either assume 𝑔𝑡 = 0 for all t, or posit that the authorities set the Taylor 
rule parameter 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎, which essentially nullifies these demand shocks.  Having only one shock 
means the solution for 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 will be proportional to 𝑢𝑡 , which means that the expected 𝑡 + 1 
values of these variables can be written as 𝜌 times their current values.  Then taking the total 
differentials of (5) with 𝑖𝑡 represented by the Taylor rule and (6), one arrives at a constraint 
between movements in the real interest rate 𝑟𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] as 
(10) 𝑟𝑡 = �
𝜎(1−𝜌)
𝜎(1−𝜌)+𝜑𝑥
(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)� 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1]. 
Details can be found in Appendix 1.8.2.  The term in the brackets of (10) must be negative if 
𝜑𝜋 < 𝜌 for any positive 𝜑𝑥, and 𝜑𝑥 > 0 is then also required by the determinacy condition 
10 
 
(9).6  For any policy setting that is not explosive or accommodative of sunspots, the real 
interest rate must decline in expected inflation when 𝜑𝜋 < 𝜌, rise in expected inflation when 
𝜑𝜋 > 𝜌 or indeed not change in expected inflation (interest rate change matches inflation) 
when 𝜑𝜋 = 𝜌.  Figure 1.1 presents an illustrative simulation of the period t effects of 𝑢𝑡 on 
the real interest rate for various settings of 𝜑𝜋.  In addition, Figure 1.2 shows the impulse 
responses to the unit of 𝑢𝑡 in DYNARE/MATLAB with the parameter values of 𝜌 = 0.5,
𝜑𝜋 = 0.3, 𝜑𝑥 = 22, 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 = 1, 𝑘 = 0.3, 𝛽 = 0.99.  The effect of 𝑢𝑡 is to change 𝑟𝑡 in the 
opposite direction after which it returns gradually to the steady-state.  
                                                 
6 From equation (9): 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌 + 𝜌 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0 
                                 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌) + 𝑘(𝜌 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0 
                                 (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 𝑘(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋) + 𝑘(1 − 𝜌). 




If 𝜑𝜋 < 𝜌, 𝜑𝑥 is always positive.  Since 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 𝑘 > 0 and 0 < 𝜌 < 1, 𝜑𝑥 > 0. 
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Figure 1.1: Simulated Deviations in the Real Interest Rate Created by a Unit Shock in 𝒖𝒕  
 
Note: Assumed parameters: 𝜌 = 0.5, Γ = 2, 𝑘 = 0.3, 𝜎 = 1, 𝛽 = 0.99. The 𝜑𝑥  term is set in each 
case so that the right side of the determinacy condition (9) is equal to 0.05.  
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Figure 1.2 Impulse Responses to 𝒖𝒕: Real Interest Rates Decline with Inflation 
 Assumed parameters:  𝜌 = 0.5, 𝜑𝜋 = 0.3, 𝜑𝑥 = 22, 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 = 1, 𝑘 = 0.3, 𝛽 = 0.99 
It should be noted that setting 𝜑𝜋 < 𝜌 (with 𝜑𝑥 high enough to assure determinacy) will 
never provide an optimal outcome in this baseline NKM.7  Figure 1.3 illustrates the effect of 
                                                 
7 As a qualification, we mention here that Thurston (2012) demonstrates that if the welfare function maximized by 
the authorities contains a term reflecting the variance of the interest rate, and if the weight on this variance 
approaches infinity, the optimal Taylor rule will result in this limit to a constant.  Inflation and projected inflation 
respond positively to 𝑢-(and 𝑔-)shocks –thus, another example of the real interest rate declining in inflation.  More 
to the point, this is a case where the optimal policy requires that the real interest rate decline in inflation.  
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constraining 𝜑𝜋 to equal or below 𝜌.  Determinate Taylor rule settings are restricted to a range 
that cannot include the optimal setting. 































𝜑𝑥. The dotted line indicates the boundaries 
of the determinacy condition 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) + 𝜑𝑥(1 − 𝛽) > 0. The intercept of solid line at the vertical axis must be 
greater than 𝜌. 
 
It is worth noting also that the optimal setting of the Taylor rule must involve the Taylor 
Principle (real interest rates rising in inflation), which conforms to the result of CGG (1999, p. 








(11) 𝑖𝑡 = �1 +
(1−𝜌)𝑘𝜎
𝜌Γ




where the term in brackets must be greater than unity.  To say that the Taylor Principle should 
apply is of course using “should” in the normative sense rather than a condition for determinacy. 
An Example for g-shocks Only 
What if the origin of the inflation in question comes from the demand side (through 𝑔)?  
Does the determinacy condition (9) mean the real interest rate must move in the same direction 
as inflation?  The answer is no, the real interest rate and inflation rate can move in different, 
opposite direction, although the conditions are less straightforward than in the previous example.  
We derive two boundary conditions relating 𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥, in addition to one shown earlier for 
determinacy. The first additional boundary: 




which implies that the real interest rate declines in expected inflation given a positive g-shock.  
The second additional boundary: 




𝜎(1 − 𝜆)(𝛽𝜆 − 1)
𝑘
, 
which implies that the inflation rate and g-shocks are positively relative.  Details also can be 
found in Appendix 1.8.2. 
These boundary conditions are illustrated in Figure 1.4.  As before, determinacy requires 
the combination of  𝜑𝜋 and  𝜑𝑥  lie to the Northeast of the dotted boundary.  The first new 
boundary is for the condition  𝜑𝜋 < 𝜆 +
(𝛽𝛽−1)𝜑𝑥
𝑘
  which assures that real interest rates will 
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decline as 𝑔 and inflation rise.  (Recall that 𝜆 is the autoregressive parameter in the 𝑔 process, 






which is required in order for inflation to rise with the 𝑔-shocks.  The shadowed area to the left 
in the Figure 1.4 represents combinations that provide determinacy, positive impacts of 𝑔𝑡 on 
inflation, and declines in the real interest rates as 𝑔𝑡 and inflation both rise.  Figure 1.5 illustrates 
the impulse responses from DYNARE/MATLAB calculations for a downward movement in real 
interest rates, in response to a positive shock of 𝑔𝑡, followed by a gradual increase in the real 
interest rate back to equilibrium. 
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Figure 1.4. Regions Where the Real Interest Rates Decline when Inflation Increases Upon 
Arrival of a 𝒈 shock 
 
Note: Shadowed area is where demand shocks increase expected inflation which leads to negatively real 
interest rate effect.  Assumed parameters: 𝝀 = 𝟎.𝟓,𝝋𝝅 = 𝟏.𝟎𝟎,𝝋𝒙 = −𝟎.𝟑𝟏,𝝋𝒈 = 𝟏,𝒌 = 𝟎.𝟑,𝜷 =




Figure 1.5. Impulse Response to 𝒈𝒕: Real Interest Rates Declines with Inflation 
Assumed parameters: 𝜆 = 0.5,𝜑𝜋 = 1.02,𝜑𝑥 = −0.31,𝜑𝑔 = 1,𝑘 = 0.3,𝛽 = 0.99,𝜎 = 1 
1.6 Conflating the Taylor Rule with the Taylor Principle 
The interpretation of the NKM-Taylor rule determinacy condition by Woodford (2001, p. 233) is 
probably the most elegantly expressed and most widely cited: 
The determinacy condition…has a simple interpretation.  A feedback rule satisfies 
the Taylor Principle if it implies that in the event of a sustained increase in the 
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inflation rate by k percent, the nominal interest rate will eventually be raised by more 
than k percent.  In the context of the model sketched above, each percentage point of 
permanent increase in the inflation rate implies an increase in the long-run average 
output gap of  1−𝛽
𝑘
 percent; thus a rule of the form conforms to the Taylor Principle if 
an only if the coefficients 𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥 satisfy  𝜑𝜋 +
1−𝛽
𝑘
𝜑𝑥 > 1.  In particular, the 
coefficient values necessarily satisfy the criterion, regardless of the size of 𝛽 and 𝑘.  
Thus the kind of feedback prescribed in the Taylor rule [𝜑𝑥 = 0.5,𝜑𝜋 = 1.5] suffices 
to determine an equilibrium price level. 
What is our objection to the statement above?  First, the paragraph implies that the determinacy 
condition influences the dynamic paths of 𝜋𝑡 (and presumably 𝑥𝑡), whereas we noted earlier that 
(9) ensures unique paths for 𝜋 and 𝑥 which are reached instantly according to NKM.  Second, 
Woodford’s statement suggests that in order for these unique paths to be obtained the Taylor 
Principle must be applied - i.e., real interest rates must rise with inflation.  It has become nearly 
universal to assert that positive co-variation between the real interest rate and inflation is critical 
in avoiding explosive solutions and sunspots.  Table 1.8.3 in Appendix lists recent articles and is 
grouped according to the level of explicitness with which they conflate the Taylor Principle (real 
interest rates rising in inflation) with the standard determinacy condition (9). 
The important result we found was that the standard eigenvalue condition (9) for this 
model is sufficient but not necessary in the case of the standard baseline NKM with Taylor rule.8  
                                                 
8 Rising real interest in inflation may be necessary for optimality, but not for uniqueness and stability. 
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In particular, when the model has only one shock (9) is less “stringent.”  For examples, the 
conditions for only 𝑢 shock case: 
(1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 + 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌) > 0 
and for only 𝑔 shock case: 
(1 − 𝛽𝜆)𝜑𝑥 + 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜆) > 0. 
The latter applies over a certain range that cannot have a “too negative” value of 𝜑𝑥.  In 
Woodford (2001), only the 𝑔 shock is considered.  In CGG (1999), only the 𝑢 shock is part of 
the optimal paths.  Thurston (2010, 2012) further demonstrates another essential point in CGG 
(1999) which the Taylor rule which gives optimal paths subject to being able to have the interest 
rate jump to offset 𝑔 shocks.  The result is that 𝑔 shocks are effectively removed from the 
solution.  In this case, the solution is a function of only one shock, and the model can be written 
as two univariate forward equations each having the same “b.”9  The condition b in the unit 
circle implies the conditions above, which are “inside” the standard one.  These are examples for 
demonstrating the determinacy condition intuitively.   
 
                                                 
9 Thurston (2010, 2012) derived an optimal Taylor rule for the model (5), (6), and (8) as 









which obviously provides multiple possible values for 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋.  As illustrated in Figure 1.6 in Appendix 1.8.1., 
the unique, optimal paths 
𝑥𝑡 = −
𝑘





𝑘2 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝜌)
𝑢𝑡 





The literature has erroneously conflated the Taylor Principle with the NKM determinacy 
condition.  They are two different kettles of fish. 
1.8 Appendixes 
1.8.1 The Interpretation of Determinacy Condition in CGG(1999) 
To demonstrate the optimized model of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) has a less “stringent” 
determinacy condition than the standard determinacy one: first, solve the model for 𝜋𝑡  and 𝑥𝑡 as 
function of their two expected values, 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] and 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1]; second, convert these into a two-
equation, univariate model using the first order condition, 𝑥𝑡 = −
𝑘
Γ
𝜋𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1] =
−𝑘
Γ





𝜑𝑥).   
Taking the univariate equations above for 𝜋𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡 as functions of 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] and 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1], 
respectively, find a value for 𝜑𝑥 that makes the coefficient on the expected future values just 
equal to unity in each equation (the expression will be the same in both equations).  The value 
of 𝜑𝑥′  for 𝜋𝑡 shown in Figure 1.6 is: 




This establishes the “borderline” 𝜑𝑥′  and the associated 𝜑𝜋′  which will meet the optimality 









𝜑𝑥 and the 
lower boundary of the determinacy condition expressed as 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 = 0.  
The intersection solution for 𝜑𝑥 is 𝜑𝑥′′ is: 




Values of 𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥 must exceed 𝜑𝑥′′ and its associated 𝜑𝜋′′ in Figure 1.6 in order to meet the 
standard determinacy condition.  
Third, subtract (13) from (12): 




The value of (14) is positive given the fact that both numerator and denominator are negative. 
The borderline combinations for 𝜑𝜋 and 𝜑𝑥 in the standard case are larger, respectively, than 






Figure 1.6. The Optimality Condition and the Determinacy Condition 
 
Note: [𝜑𝑥′  , 𝜑𝜋′ ] is the intercept of borderline and the optimal locus which meets 
optimality/time-consistency and make the coefficient on the future value equal to one.  
[𝜑𝑥′′ , 𝜑𝜋′′] is the intercept whose values are optimal and meet the standard determinacy 
lower-bound, 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽) = 0. 
 
We can observe that two lines, the borderline and the standard determinacy lower-bound, 
have the same slope.  This can be shown analytically by letting the coefficient on the expected 
future value less than unity in either one of two univariate equations from CGG(1999) model.  
Rearranging the inequality, we obtain: 
𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝜋 >
𝛤(𝛽 − 1) − 𝑘2
𝛤 𝜎. 
Since 𝛽 has the value between zero and one, the right hand side of the inequality always has 
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negative value.10  The determinacy condition of the optimized CGG(1999) implies that the 
coefficient on the expected future value is less than one.  Thus, the determinacy condition for the 
optimized model of CGG(1999) is less stringent than the standard determinacy condition.  
1.8.2 The Comovement of Real Interest Rate and Inflation  
To derive the condition for which the real interest rate will move in the opposite direction of 
inflation while the model still satisfies the NKM determinacy condition, first, consider the case 
where inflation is driven exclusively by 𝑢𝑡 as in (10). Noting that 𝜋𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1]
𝜌
 write the real 
interest rate 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] = 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] = �
𝜑𝜋
𝜌
− 1� 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] + 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡.  
Substitute this last expression into (5) and, noting that 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1] = 𝜌𝑥𝑡 , derive (10). The NKM 
determinacy condition will be met with 𝜑𝜋 < 𝜌 provided that 𝜑𝑥 is large enough. 
To obtain conditions where inflation is exclusively driven by 𝑔𝑡, note that 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1] =
𝜆𝑥𝑡  and 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] = 𝜆𝜋𝑡 and that the real interest rate is proportional to expected inflation: 




We obtain (15) by substituting out 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1] and 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] in (5) and (6) by 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1] =
𝜆𝑥𝑡  and 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] = 𝜆𝜋𝑡, and then we substitutes them into Taylor rule 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 (note 
that we let 𝜑𝑔 = 0, so 𝑔𝑡-shocks are not nullified by 𝜑𝑔), the real interest rate is that the nominal 
                                                 
10 It is also true when the value of 𝛤 either approaches infinity or equals zero.  Using 𝐿’𝐻𝑜�𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑝𝑝’s rule, we can find 
the limit of right hand side of inequality is an negative value: 𝜎(𝛽 − 1), when 𝛤 approaches infinity or equals zero. 
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interest rate subtracts the expected inflation.  One boundary condition used in Figure 1.4 is that 
the real interest rate declines in expected inflation; this requires 𝜑𝜋 < (
(𝛽𝛽−1)𝜑𝑥
𝑘
+ 𝜆.  Next, 
substitute (15) and (5) into (6) to derive an expression for inflation (and 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1]) that is a 





]� 𝑔𝑡.  For the coefficient on 𝑔𝑡 to be 






which also is illustrated in Figure 7.  Finally, the NKM determinacy condition (9) boundary as 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2 THE SOCIAL WELFARE LOSS AND THE SIMPLE TAYLOR RULE 








Taylor rules, in general, have the symbolic expression 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡.  This three-
term Taylor rule is the most efficient Taylor rule in terms of the social welfare loss measurement 
(i.e., the minimized social welfare loss involved with the three-term Taylor rule is the smallest 
value when we compare it with the minimized social welfare loss involved with a one-term 
Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡) or a two-term Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡).)  The three-term Taylor 
rule is used in this paper as the benchmark for comparing the performance of these kinds of 
Taylor rules.  However, some people may object or think that it is impractical or “unrealistic” to 
expect the central bank (“the Fed”) bases a rule on a shock term (𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡), and because of this 
reason, my focus is only on two-term (“simple”) Taylor rules which do not have 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡 term—i.e., 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡—, in this chapter and next chapter.  From now on and through the rest of the 
dissertation, the two-term Taylor rules are called the simple Taylor rules for distinguishing them 
from the three-term Taylor rules.   
This chapter is a study of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 when the simple Taylor rules 
are specified as the optimal interest rate rules, which I call the “optimal simple” Taylor rule, for 
governing the optimal paths of output gap (𝑥𝑡) and inflation rate (𝜋𝑡).  The first part of this study 
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+ 𝜌—, which meets the first order condition for minimum social welfare loss, 𝐿 =
1
2
𝐸[𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2].   
The second part is the discussion of two properties of the optimal linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 
and 𝜑𝜋 that are observed by comparing with the three-term Taylor rules: (a) the linear 
relationship is the same for governing the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 whether g-shocks are 
nullified by containing 𝜑g = 𝜎 in the baseline new Keynesian model or not; (b) the limit of the 
social welfare loss containing the simple Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡) is at the minimum 
when the values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are very big (or approaching infinity), and such minimum is the 
same as the social welfare loss containing the three-term Taylor rule.  This implies the three-
term Taylor rule with 𝜑𝑔(= 𝜎) suggested by Woodford (2001), whose model has different 
setup but it works out with the same result, is more efficient than the simple (two-term) Taylor 





In Chapter 1 we show that a particular (three-term) Taylor rule, 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡, 
is specified as the optimal interest rate rule (or the optimal Taylor rule) for governing the optimal 









which is the first order condition for minimum social welfare loss whose specification is similar 








where the subscript 𝑝 denotes the present value of the social welfare loss over time11, and when 
𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 
for nullifying g-shocks in the baseline new Keynesian model introduced in section 1.3 equation 
(5): 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1] −
1
𝜎
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1]) + 𝑔𝑡 
and equation (6): 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] + 𝑢𝑡 . 
                                                 
11 𝐿𝑠 is a positive value but the 𝑊 function (i.e., equation (7) in section 1.3) is a negative value.  𝐿𝑠 and 𝑊 both 
have multiple terms over time.  I will only need the first term of 𝐿𝑠 in chapter 2 and chapter 3 because the Fed’s 
policy strategy is assumed to be the commitment to the Taylor rules and the solution expectation for all period is the 
same as the solution for period t.  The detail explanation for only using the first term of 𝐿𝑠 is in the section 2.2. 
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The derivation of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 shown above is not a difficult task once we 
nullify g-shocks.  See the details of the derivation in Appendix 2.5.1.  In addition, the linear 
relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 for the particular Taylor rule in the case of a central bank’s 







+ 𝜌.                                                                                               (1) 
Appendix 2.5.2 shows the Maple commands for obtaining (1). 
However, the derivation of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the case of a simple 
Taylor rule, 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡,                                                                                                                                        (2) 
is not an easy task when the g-shocks are not nullified in the baseline new Keynesian model.12    
The first part of this chapter provides an alternative approach to avoid messy analytical result or 
no result.  The alternative approach involves three components: (a) Thurston’s (2010, 2012) 
method for obtaining general solutions of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 in the central-bank loss function which is 
presented in Appendix 2.5.4; (b) the first and second partial derivative tests; and (c) the 
mathematical concepts of limit.   
The second part of this chapter is the discussion of two properties of the optimal linear 
relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule (2): (a) the linear relationship obtained from 
the case of commitment to the simple Taylor rule (2) is the same as the relationship (1) from the 
case of commitment to the three-term Taylor rule; (b) the limit of the social welfare loss 
                                                 
12 In Appendix 2.5.3, I demonstrate the result of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 for (2) is either a mess or void 
when the same approach from Appendix 2.5.2 is applied. 
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containing the simple Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡) is at the minimum when the values of 𝜑𝑥 
and 𝜑𝜋 are very big (or approaching infinity), and such minimum is the same as the social 
welfare loss containing the three-term Taylor rule.  This implies the three-term Taylor rule with 
𝜑𝑔(= 𝜎) suggested by Woodford (2001), whose model has different setup but it works out with 
the same result, is more efficient than the simple Taylor rule.  The first property implies that the 
optimal linear relationship between 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 is the same for governing the optimal paths of 
output gap (𝑥𝑡) and inflation rate (𝜋𝑡) whether the Taylor rule nullifies g-shocks or not.  The 
second property implies that the three-term Taylor rule is more efficient because it allows us to 
perfectly eliminate the g-shocks while the simple Taylor rule cannot.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2.2 derives the linear 
relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule (2).  The relationship is the constraint for 
determining the values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 when the social welfare loss is at minimum.  Section 2.3 
compares the social welfare loss containing the simple Taylor rule and the social welfare loss 
containing the three-term Taylor rule.  I observe that the minimized social welfare loss 
containing the three-term Taylor rule is smaller than the minimized social welfare loss 
containing the simple Taylor rule.  Furthermore, when 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are approaching infinity, the 
limiting value of the minimized social welfare loss containing the simple Taylor rule is the same 
as the minimized social welfare loss containing the three-term Taylor rule.  Note that I am not 
suggesting that the Fed can force 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 to approach infinity.  It is only for the comparison 
purpose not for the practical reason by letting 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 approach infinity when we want to 
know the performance of different Taylor rules.  When the performance of a Taylor rule is 
improved, the minimized social welfare loss containing such Taylor rule will be reduced and 
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move close to the minimized social welfare loss containing the three-term Taylor rule.  I will 
discuss this application in details in Chapter 3.  Section 2.4 contains the conclusion.  Section 2.5 
contains the appendices.  
2.2 An Optimal Monetary Policy is Specified by a Simple Taylor Rule 
The analytical derivation remains unsolved for the linear relationship which is the constraint for 
determining the values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 when the social welfare loss containing the simple Taylor 
rule is at minimum.  On the other hand, Woodford (2001, p.235) and Thurston (2010, 2012) both 
solve the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the case of three-term Taylor rule which g-shocks 
are nullified13 by 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎, whose results are the same as the equation (1) shown in the Section 
2.1.  This paper provides the method for determining the analytical values of the optimal14 
𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the NKM from the viewpoint of the central-bank policy actions following from its 
commitment to the simple Taylor rule (2).  The specification of equation (2) is the first step.  The 
second step, I specify the model economy in the new Keynesian theories which is the baseline 
NKM well defined in Chapter 1 section 1.3 included the equation of output gap 𝑥𝑡 from a 
forward-looking IS curve shown as 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 −
1
𝜎
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑔𝑡                                                                                        (3a) 
and the equation of inflation 𝜋𝑡 from a New Keynesian Philips curve shown as 
                                                 
13 Walsh (2003, p.549) also had the description for using 𝜑𝑔 to nullify 𝑔𝑡 (my expression of output gap shocks).  
Note that Walsh used 𝑢𝑡 for the expression of output gap shocks in his book.     
14 At this point, these are only optimal conditional on the central bank following the simple Taylor rule which 
guarantee the extremum of loss function.  When the central bank commits to the rule, the fully optimal policy are 
those been studied in Walsh (2003) section 11.3.   
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𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑡,                                                                                                         (3b) 
where 𝑔𝑡 is the demand shocks and 𝑢𝑡 is the inflation shocks.  0 < 𝛽 < 1, 𝑘,𝜎 > 0, 0 < 𝜌 < 1 
and 0 < 𝜆 < 1.  For the ease of exposition, the shocks in this paper follow the AR(1) processes15, 
so 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡, where 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 are i.i.d. normally distributed with 
variances 𝜎𝜀2 and 𝜎𝜂2.  The shocks are interrelated by construction in the baseline NKM.  
Inflation rate is correlated to g-shocks because of 𝑘𝑥𝑡 term in the (3b).  Output gap is correlated 
to u-shocks because of 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 term in the (3a).  Macroeconomists usually assumed the 
innovations 𝜀 and 𝜂 of g-shocks and u-shocks are i.i.d. for simplicity and based on the 
specification of g-shocks and u-shocks.  For 𝜀𝑡: 𝑔𝑡 ≡ 𝐸𝑡𝑦�𝑡+1
𝑓 − 𝑦𝑡+1
𝑓  and 𝑦𝑓 is the flexible-price 
output.  𝑦𝑡
𝑓 is derived and determined from Calvo’s model of price stickiness, which output is 
determined by labor input and aggregate productivity disturbance (See Walsh 2003, p.234 and 
p.244).1  For 𝜂𝑡: 𝑢𝑡 is assumed, unless it is permanent, to ultimately affect only the price level, it 
is called price shock (See Walsh 2003, pp.253-4).  It is reasonable to assume that 𝜀 and 𝜂 are 
uncorrelated: 𝜎𝜀𝜂 = 0.  The productivity disturbance 𝜀 and price shock 𝜂 do not necessarily have 
correlation because productivity related to innovation and R&D and price shock can be arbitrary 
and pure nominal phenomenon which has no real impact to productivity.  
The third step is obtaining the general solutions of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 in equations (3).  It starts with 
substituting 𝑖𝑡 by (2) in (3a), according to the assumption and the suggestion from Walsh (2003) 
that the central bank commits to the simple Taylor rule (2), and apply the method of 
                                                 
15 We can have a simplifying assumption for having common degree of serial correlation 𝜌 = 𝜆 in order to construct 
an example.  For the details of the discussion of serial correlation, see Woodford (2003, pp.514-7). 
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undetermined coefficients by setting 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 as functions of g-shocks and u-shocks with 
undetermined coefficients: 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝑝1(𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡) + 𝑝2(𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡)                                                                                  (4a) 
and 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑏1(𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡) + 𝑏2(𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡),                                                                                 (4b) 
where 𝑝1,𝑝2, 𝑏1 and 𝑏2 are undetermined coefficients.  The solutions of these undetermined 
coefficients have the values which 𝑝1 = − (𝛽𝜆 − 1)𝜎 𝛹1⁄ , 𝑝2 = 𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋 𝛹2⁄ , 𝑏1 = 𝑘𝜎 𝛹1⁄ , and 
𝑏2 = − (𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥) 𝛹2⁄ , where  𝛹1 =  𝛽𝜆2𝜎 − 𝛽𝜆𝜎 − 𝛽𝜆𝜑𝑥 − 𝑘𝜆 + 𝑘𝜑𝜋 − 𝜆𝜎 + 𝜎 + 𝜑𝑥 and  
𝛹2 = 𝛽𝜌2𝜎 − 𝛽𝜌𝜎 − 𝛽𝜌𝜑𝑥 − 𝑘𝜌 + 𝑘𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌𝜎 + 𝜎 + 𝜑𝑥.  𝛹1 ≠ 0 and 𝛹2 ≠ 0 are required.  I 
will discuss the properties of 𝛹1 and 𝛹2  later in this section.  Then substituting these analytical 













𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥
𝛹2
�𝑢𝑡 .                                                                                          (5b) 
Appendix 2.5.4 provides Maple commands for a quick review of the derivations of (4) and (5). 
In step 4, I assume the central bank’s objective is to minimize a loss function that balances 
inflation stability against output gap variability (e.g., Walsh (2003, p.533)).  Commitment to the 
simple Taylor rule implies that the central bank adjusts its interest rate in response to 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 
in each period (see equation (2)) in response to realized shocks.  Furthermore, since I use only 𝑥𝑡 
and 𝜋𝑡 in Taylor rules instead of using 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1 (i.e., the difference between price levels 
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in two periods) in Taylor rules, the Taylor rules do not cause optimal inertia.16   In other words, 
the Fed has once-and-for-all response to the new development in either 𝑥𝑡 or 𝜋𝑡, or both.  Such 
new developments are either from realized output gap shocks or inflation rate shocks or both.  
The monetary policy objective function is then treated as a periodically quadratic social welfare 
loss function for two target variables and their coefficients because the solution expectation for 
all periods is the same as the solution for period t.  The symbolic expression of the periodically 




𝐸[𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2],                                                                                                                                     (6) 
where E is the expectational operator and 𝛤 is the weights on output gap.17  I treat 𝛤 as a 
structure parameter18 reflecting the society’s preference.  Substituting the right-hand side of 
equations (5a-b) into (6) for 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 and taking expectation, we obtain the social welfare loss 


























                                                 
16 See Marest and Thurston (2017) for Taylor rules include price level, “global” optimum and optimal inertia. 
17 The reason I use (6) instead of a social welfare loss function includes some lifecycle of outcome variabilities like 
the one in Chapter 1 section 1.3 equation (7), which is also shown in the previous section (section 2.1) on page 26, 
because the results in Chapter 2 are prepared and will be applied to the Chapter 3 in a case when a central bank 
commit to the simple Taylor rule (2) in the beginning of the period t but he cannot adjust interest rate for 
unobservable shocks when he sets up the interest rate in the beginning of the period t.  To be consistent with the 
study in the Chapter 3, I use a period quadratic loss function same as the one I will use in the Chapter 3.  




�, in Walsh’s notation, which 
reflects risk aversion σ, demand elasticity η, markup θ from output, discount rate 𝛽 and fraction (1-ω) of all firms’ 
optimally adjusting price each period.  
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(𝑘2 + 𝛤(𝛽𝜆 − 1)2)(𝜎)2
𝛹12
� 𝜎𝜀2 + �
(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥)2 + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)2
𝛹22
� 𝜎𝜂2� .             (7) 
I then determine the “optimal” values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 for the extremum of 𝐿 in (7) by using the 
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𝛹13













�𝜎𝜀2.                                                      (8b) 
Equations (8a) and (8b) tell us how much changes in social welfare loss from the changes in 𝜑𝑥 
and 𝜑𝜋.   
According to the first partial derivative test, the extremum happens when 𝐿𝜑𝑥(𝜑𝑥,𝜑𝜋) = 0 
and 𝐿𝜑𝜋(𝜑𝑥,𝜑𝜋) = 0, and the point (𝜑𝑥
∗ ,𝜑𝜋∗ ) is called a stationary point for being the extremum 
of L in (7).  Let equations (8a) and (8b) jointly equal to zero, I have the simultaneous equation 







[𝑘(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)(𝛽𝜌 − 1)](𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)
𝛹23
� 𝜎𝜂2  +  �
�(𝑘𝜎)2 + Γ�(𝛽𝜆 − 1)𝜎�2� (𝛽𝜆 − 1)
𝛹13
�𝜎𝜀2  = 0 — (9𝑝)
�
[𝑘(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)(𝛽𝜌 − 1)](𝜑𝑥 + 𝜎 − 𝜌𝜎)
𝛹23
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[𝑘(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)(𝛽𝜌 − 1)](𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)
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�
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[𝑘(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)(𝛽𝜌 − 1)](𝜑𝑥 + 𝜎 − 𝜌𝜎)
𝛹23
�� 𝜎𝜂2 = 0 — (10). 
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𝛹23




� {[𝑘(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)(𝛽𝜌 − 1)](𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)}
+ {[𝑘(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)(𝛽𝜌 − 1)](𝜑𝑥 + 𝜎 − 𝜌𝜎)} = 0 
[𝑘(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥) + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)(𝛽𝜌 − 1)] ��
𝑘
(𝛽𝜆 − 1)
� (𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋) + (𝜑𝑥 + 𝜎 − 𝜌𝜎)� = 0 
 therefore, I derive two possible coefficient relationships between 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 either from the first 







+ 𝜌                                                                               (11a) 
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or from the second square bracket of the left-hand side of equation, 
(𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽𝜆)𝜑𝑥 = (1 − 𝜌)(𝛽𝜆 − 1)𝜎.                                                                  (11𝑏) 
These two possible relationships each will produce a set of stationary point (𝜑𝑥∗ ,𝜑𝜋∗ ), but only 
(11a) is valid because (11b) violates the NKM determinacy condition, (𝜑𝜋 − 1)𝑘 +
(1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0, for being an negative value19 in the right-hand side.  The valid linear 
relationship (11a) is the constraint for determining the values of the coefficients in the simple 
Taylor rule (2).   
Next I determine 𝜑𝑥∗ and 𝜑𝜋∗  by using (11a) and (11b).  Substituting (11a) into (11b) and 
solving (11b) for 𝜑𝑥, I obtain 
𝜑𝑥∗ = (𝜌 − 1)𝜎.                                                                                                                                           (12) 
Substituting (12) into (11a) and solving (11a) for 𝜑𝜋, I obtain  
𝜑𝜋∗ = 𝜌. 20                                                                                                                                                     (13) 
Substituting (12) and (13) into (7), and note that 
�
(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥)2 + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)2
𝛹22
� 𝜎𝜂2 
from the second square bracket of (7) can be further simplified and factored as: 
                                                 
19 Rearrange the NKM determinacy condition: 
(𝜑𝜋 − 1)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0 
⟹ (𝜑𝜋 − 1 + 𝜌 − 𝜌)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽 + 𝛽𝜆 − 𝛽𝜆)𝜑𝑥 > 0 
⟹ (𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽𝜆)𝜑𝑥 + (𝜌 − 1)𝑘 + (𝛽𝜆 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0 
⟹ (𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽𝜆)𝜑𝑥 > (1 − 𝜌)𝑘 + 𝛽(1 − 𝜆)𝜑𝑥 > 0, (if 𝜑𝑥 > 0) 
but (𝜑𝜋 − 𝜌)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽𝜆)𝜑𝑥 = (1 − 𝜌)(𝛽𝜆 − 1)𝜎 < 0, 
therefore (11b) is invalid. 




�(𝜌 − 1)𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥�
2
+ 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)2
�(𝛽𝜌 − 1)[(𝜌 − 1)𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥] + 𝑘(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)�
2 , 
so it becomes 0
0
 when 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are substituted out by 𝜑𝑥∗ = (𝜌 − 1)𝜎 and 𝜑𝜋∗ = 𝜌 at the same 




(𝛤(𝛽𝜆 − 1)2 + 𝑘2)𝜎2
2�(𝛽𝜆 − 1)𝜎 − 𝑘�
2(𝜌 − 𝜆)2
𝜎𝜀2.                                                                                          (14) 
However, the above extreme is not possible to achieve because 𝜑𝑥∗ and 𝜑𝜋∗  cannot be applied to 
the simple Taylor rule (2).   Substitute (12) and (13) into the NKM determinacy condition, 
(𝜑𝜋 − 1)𝑘 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜑𝑥 > 0, I obtain 
(𝜌 − 1)𝜎(1 − 𝛽) + 𝑘(𝜌 − 1) > 0, 
because 
(𝜌 − 1)𝜎(1 − 𝛽) < 0 
and 
𝑘(𝜌 − 1) < 0, 
therefore, 𝜑𝑥∗ and 𝜑𝜋∗  cannot both be the coefficient values of the simple Taylor rule (2) at the 
same time for governing the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡.  This can be proved by substituting (12) 
and (13) into (5a) and (5b) for obtaining the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡, and I obtain no result for 
𝜋𝑡 because of division by zero.  Since (12) and (13) are derived from (11a) and (11b), this 
unfortunate result is obvious because (11b) violates the NKM determinacy condition.  Thus, (11a) 
is the only linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 which produces a set of stationary point for obtaining 
the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 when the simple Taylor rule (2) is specified as the optimal Taylor 
rule.  For example, I can obtain the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 by substituting (11a) and (12) into 





𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
𝑢𝑡 −
𝜎(𝛽𝜆 − 1)
(𝜌 − 𝜆)(𝑘 + 𝜎 − 𝛽𝜆𝜎)
𝑔𝑡,                                                               (15) 
and by substituting (11a) and (12) into (5b) for optimal 𝜋𝑡: 
𝜋𝑡 =
𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝜌)
𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
𝑢𝑡 +
𝑘𝜎
(𝜌 − 𝜆)(𝑘 + 𝜎 − 𝛽𝜆𝜎)
𝑔𝑡.                                                                   (16) 







𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
� 𝜎𝜂2 +
(𝛤(𝛽𝜆 − 1)2 + 𝑘2)𝜎2
2�(𝛽𝜆 − 1)𝜎 − 𝑘�
2(𝜌 − 𝜆)2
𝜎𝜀2.                                                 (17) 
With this, I complete the derivation.   
A Numerical Experiment: 
This experiment shows that the minimum L occurs when the points on L is satisfied by 
(11a).  Note the previous analysis is based on equations (5a-b).  Since equations (5a-b) have the 
same expressions as the case involve the particular Taylor rule 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡 with 
𝜑𝑔 = 0, for comparison purpose, this experiment is conducted based on the case involve the 
particular Taylor rule.  I will show that (11a) holds for different values of 𝜑𝑔.  In Figure 2.1, the 
values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are plotted along the horizontal axis and the values of L are plotted along 
the vertical axis.  The value of 𝜑𝑔 is presumed to equal 𝜎 for nullifying g-shocks.  The parameter 
values used in Figure 2.1 are 𝑘 = 0.03,𝛽 = 0.99, Γ = 0.05,𝜎 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.9, and 𝜌 = 0.9.  The 
shocks are assumed to be unity so 𝜎𝜀2 = 1 and 𝜎𝜂2 = 1.  The social welfare loss (which has the 
































(𝑘2 + 𝛤(𝛽𝜆 − 1)2)�𝜎 − 𝜑𝑔�
2
𝛹12
� 𝜎𝜀2 + �
(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥)2 + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)2
𝛹22










(0.0161 − 0.109𝜑𝑥 − 0.03𝜑𝜋)2
� , 
where the subscript PTR denotes the particular Taylor rule—i.e., 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡.  
Note that the difference between (7) and 𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃 is that the coefficient term on the 𝜎𝜀2 has (𝜎)2 with 
the simple Taylor rule and the coefficient term on the 𝜎𝜀2 has �𝜎 − 𝜑𝑔�
2
 with the particular 
Taylor rule.  In other words, we can treat the case with the simple Taylor rule has the same 
welfare loss as the case with the particular Taylor rule with the particular Taylor rule and 𝜑𝑔 = 0. 






𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
� 𝜎𝜂2 
—i.e., 
𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃,𝑠𝑠𝑚 = 16.73304106, 
where the subscript PTR denotes particular Taylor rule and the subscript min denotes minimum 
value.  The grey plane is tracing out (11a)—i.e., 
𝜑𝜋 = 1.450458716 + 5.504587156𝜑𝑥. 
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In other words, (11a) is the line where the yellow, top surface tangent to the green, bottom plane.  
So when (11a) is satisfied, L is minimized.   
Figure 2.1. The Optimal Constraint of 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅 
 
Does different values of 𝜑𝑔 change the relationship between minimum L and (11a)?  Put it 
differently, does minimum L occurs according to (11a) when g-shocks are not nullified?  Does 
the value of 𝜑𝑔 affect the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋?  No, the value of 𝜑𝑔 does not affect 
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the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋.  This is because (11a) can be derived directly from solving 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝜑𝑥
= 0 and 𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝜑𝜋
= 0 together for 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋.  Recall that Figure 2.1 has 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 built in, so I 
first produce three additional plots with different values of 𝜑𝑔 built in for comparing with Figure 
2.1.  Figure 2.2 shows the results of the comparison for four different values of 𝜑𝑔, (a) has 
𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 = 1, (b) has 𝜑𝑔 = 0, (c) has 𝜑𝑔 > 𝜎—i.e., 𝜑𝑔 = 2, and (d) has 𝜑𝑔 < 𝜎—i.e., 𝜑𝑔 = 0.5.  
In addition, Figure 2.2(a) implies optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡.  Figure 2.2(b) implies the policy-
rate path is based on the simple Taylor rule, 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡.  All four sub-figures have the 
same result that the grey plane is tracing out (11a) where the yellow, above surface tangents to 
the green, below plane which has (11a) built in. 
It is clear that (11a) holds whether 𝑔𝑡 is nullified by 𝜑𝑔 or not.  To make it more 
convincing, Appendix 2.5.5 shows the results of 2-D plots that minimum L occurs where the 
points satisfied (11a) on L (7) by using different parametrization (𝑘 = 0.03,𝛽 = 0.99,𝛤 =
0.05,𝜎 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.3,𝜌 = 0.7,𝜎𝜀2 = 1 and 𝜎𝜂2 = 1) for the case involving the simple Taylor rule.
44 
Figure 2.2. The Optimal Constraint of 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅 with Different Values of 𝝋𝒈 
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2.2.1 The Validity of (11a) for the Optimal Simple Taylor Rule 
I now consider the validity of (11a) for optimal policy—the optimal equilibrium relationship 
between 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 in equations (3).  For (2) to be a policy rule, it must satisfy the NKM 
determinacy condition.  Do (11a) satisfy the NKM determinacy condition?   Since (11a) is 
derived based on the values of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡, we should start from equation (5a-b).  The 
denominators 𝛹1 and 𝛹2 in equation (5a-b) must be non-zero values, so the values of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 
are defined by the right-hand sides of equation (5a-b).  Therefore, 𝛹1 can be rearranged as 






(𝜆 − 1)(𝛽𝜆 − 1)� − 𝜆� 𝑘.                                                            (18) 
The terms in the first square bracket is similar to the determinacy condition of the baseline new 
Keynesian model, 𝜑𝑥(1 − 𝛽) + 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) > 0.  The NKM determinacy condition implies that 
𝜑𝜋 + 𝜑𝑥 �
1−𝛽
𝑘




�, we know that the value of the first square 
bracket is greater than one when the determinacy condition is satisfied.21  The value of the 
second square bracket is always positive.22  Thus (18) shows that 𝛹1 > 0 when the determinacy 
condition is satisfied.  The difference between 𝛹1 and 𝛹2 is that 𝛹1 includes the serial 
                                                 
21 𝜑𝜋 + 𝜑𝑥 �
1−𝛽
𝑘
� > 1 do not imply that 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 both have to be positive.  First, the derivation of it from the 
NKM determinacy condition does not require that 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 both have to be positive, which is shown below, 
𝜑𝑥(1 − 𝛽) + 𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1) > 0, 
𝜑𝑥(1 − 𝛽) > −𝑘(𝜑𝜋 − 1), 









Second, 𝜑𝜋 + 𝜑𝑥 �
1−𝛽
𝑘
� > 1 is satisfied by having either 𝜑𝑥 < 0 or 𝜑𝜋 < 0, see Appendix 2.5.7 for a plot 
illustration. 
22 (𝜆 − 1) < 0 and (𝛽𝜆 − 1) < 0, so (𝜆 − 1)(𝛽𝜆 − 1) > 0. 
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correlation parameter 𝜆 and 𝛹2 includes the serial correlation parameter 𝜌. The same conclusion 
also applies to 𝛹2.  Now, substituting (11a) into the NKM determinacy condition and the 
condition for the optimal simple Taylor rule is then determined by 
𝜑x >
(𝜌 − 1)(−𝛽2𝜆2𝜎 + (𝑘𝜌 + 2𝜆𝜎)𝛽 − 𝑘 − 𝜎)
�(−𝜆2 + 𝜌)𝛽 − 𝜌 + 2𝜆 − 1�𝛽






(𝜌 − 1)(−𝛽2𝜆2𝜎 + (𝑘𝜌 + 2𝜆𝜎)𝛽 − 𝑘 − 𝜎)
�(−𝜆2 + 𝜌)𝛽 − 𝜌 + 2𝜆 − 1�𝛽




These two inequalities has an important implication when I determine whether the extremum is a 
minimum as the result I want to have for the social welfare loss (7) or a maximum which is an 
unwanted result for the social welfare loss (7).  The implication is found when the common 
degree of serial correlation 𝜌 = 𝜆 is assumed and these two inequalities is simplified as  
𝜑𝑥 > 𝜌𝜎 −
𝑘 + 𝜎
𝛽
, if 𝜌 > 1 
or 
𝜑𝑥 < 𝜌𝜎 −
𝑘 + 𝜎
𝛽
, if 𝜌 < 1. 
Since the value of serial correlation 𝜌 is between zero and one, I obtain an interesting condition 
for the paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 to be unique, existent, and optimal under the commitment to the 
optimal simple Taylor rule as 
𝜑𝑥 < 𝜌𝜎 −
𝑘 + 𝜎
𝛽
.                                                                                                                                      (19) 
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It is easy to see that the value of 𝜑𝑥 in (19) is always negative.23  In other words, when the 
common degree of serial correlations are the same, i.e., 𝜌 = 𝜆, the value of 𝜑𝑥 must be negative 
for having the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 under the commitment to the optimal simple Taylor 
rule.24  In the next section, I will apply the implication for determining the limit value of L in (7) 
is at the minimum. 
We can also easily observe from (18) that 𝛹1 and 𝛹2 are positively affected by higher 𝜑𝑥 
and 𝜑𝜋, if only (11a) is satisfied and 𝛤 is assumed to be positive.25  This observation implies that 
at least there is the limit value of 𝐿 in (7) as either 𝜑𝑥 or 𝜑𝜋 approaches infinity.  If this limit 
value is the same value when the economy is at its optimality, it suggests that the extremum of 
the loss function by commitment to the simple Taylor rule may only have a limit and does not 
have an unconstrained solution when the economy is not at its optimality.  Does the value of L at 
the stationary point (𝜑𝑥∗ ,𝜑𝜋∗ ) in (7) constitute a minimum, or at least, is its limit a minimum?  
This is the question of determining the extremum a minimum or a maximum using the second 
partial derivative test.  Here we turn to Section 2.3 for determining the extremum of L in (7).  In 
addition, Section 2.3 will discuss the efficiency in terms of the extremum of the loss function 
under both the commitment to the simple Taylor rule using the general-solution approach and 
under the three-term Taylor rule using the common approach. 
                                                 
23 𝜌𝜎 − 𝑘+𝜎
𝛽
= �𝜌 − 1
𝛽
� 𝜎 − 𝑘
𝛽
< 0 because 0 < 𝛽 < 1, 0 < 𝜌 < 1 and �𝜌 − 1
𝛽
� < 0. 
24 This condition is consistent with the Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1. 
25 This is no longer the case under the optimal simple Taylor rule (2) and the relation of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 implied by (19) 
is therefore not applied.  This is the case which demand shocks are not neutralized completely and cause the output 
gap and inflation to fluctuate inefficiently, see Walsh (2003, p.549) for details. 
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2.3 The Efficiency of Monetary Policy Under Commitment to the Simple 
Taylor Rule 












= 0.  The details of the result of the second partial derivative 
test are in the Appendix 2.5.6.  This implies the stationary value of L can be a relative minimum, 
a relative maximum or a saddle point.  This section I show how to determine the extremum at 
stationary points.  When the three-term Taylor rule (1) is implemented to the baseline new 
Keynesian model and g-shocks are nullified by having 𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎, the minimum social welfare loss 






𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
� 𝜎𝜂2,                                                                                                              (20) 
as Thurston (2010, 2012) shows which is an unconstrained solution.  We can get the similar 
result of minimized loss function from (7).  Substituting (11a) into the right hand side of (7) for 













𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
� 𝜎𝜂2,                                                  (21) 





+ 𝜌� + (1 − 𝛽𝜆)𝜑𝑥 + (𝜆 − 1)(𝛽𝜆 − 1)𝜎 − 𝑘𝜌.   
The difference between (20) and (21) is because the three-term Taylor rule (1) neutralizes 
the effect of 𝑔𝑡 while the simple Taylor rule (2) does not.  On the other hand, for the case of 
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commitment to the simple Taylor rule, although the simple Taylor rule (2) includes the optimal 
linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 (11a), it cannot neutralize the effect of 𝑔𝑡.   
Second, from the previous section we learn 𝛹1 and 𝛹2 are positively affected by higher 𝜑𝑥 
and 𝜑𝜋.  Set the limit of L (7), as 𝜑𝜋 is approaching infinity by letting 𝜑𝑥 approach infinity 









(𝑘𝜎)2 + 𝛤�(𝛽𝜆 − 1)𝜎�
2
𝛹12
� 𝜎𝜀2 + �









(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥)2 + 𝛤(𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)2
𝛹22
� 𝜎𝜂2� .                                               (22) 








𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
� 𝜎𝜂2.                                                                                       (23) 
The same result of (23) can be derived by taking the limit of L1 (21) as 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are 


















𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2






𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
� 𝜎𝜂2.                                                                                       (24)  
In other words, jointly, when the optimal values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule (i.e., 
(11a)) is met and these 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are approaching infinity according to (11a), L1 is approaching 
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L0.  Figure 2.3 illustrates this property26 of optimal values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 with arbitrary parameter 
values that 𝑘 = 0.3,𝛽 = 0.99, Γ = 2,𝜎 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.5,𝜌 = 0.5,𝜎𝜀2 = 1 and 𝜎𝜂2 = 1.  
To determine (24) is a minimum, I compare (24) and (21) for all 𝜑𝑥 > −∞.  The logic27 is 
as follow: once I determine the function 𝐿 = 𝐿(𝜑𝑥∗ ,𝜑𝜋∗) and 𝜑𝜋∗ = 𝑓(𝜑𝑥∗) according to (11a), I 
can write 𝐿 = 𝐿(𝜑𝑥∗ ,𝑓(𝜑𝑥∗)) = 𝐿�(𝜑𝑥∗).  Also let 𝐿�(−∞) is the symbolic expression when the 
value of equation (21) is at 𝜑𝑥 approaching infinity.  If 𝐿�(−∞) < 𝐿�(𝜑𝑥∗) for all 𝜑𝑥 ∈ (−∞,∞), 
𝐿�(−∞) is the minimum.  𝐿�(−∞) is determined by (24) with the assumption of 𝜌 = 𝜆 so (19) is 






𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
� 𝜎𝜂2. 












𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
� 𝜎𝜂2. 
𝜑𝑥 is only in the first bracket of the right-hand side of (21) associated with D and the value of the 
first bracket is always positive for all 𝜑𝑥 > −∞ because the terms in the first bracket are squared 
except Γ.  Thus, (24) is a minimum because 𝐿�(−∞) < 𝐿�(𝜑𝑥∗).  Furthermore, since 𝐿�(−∞) = 𝐿0, 
we learn that the three-term Taylor rule (1) is more efficient than the simple Taylor rule although 
                                                 
26 In Chapter 3, I will apply this property of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the case which the central bank commit to the simple 
Taylor rule but its target variables (output gap and inflation) cannot be observed at the time when the decision must 
be made by the central bank.  




nullifying g-shocks is not necessary for the specification of the optimal Taylor rule for governing 
the optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 with the linear relationship (11a) of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋.  
Figure 2.3. L1 Approaches L0 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This paper shows how to derive the linear relationship of the 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule 
and studies the properties of the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 under the commitment to the 
simple Taylor rule (2).  In summary, the steps of the derivations of the optimal values of 𝜑𝑥 and 
𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule are as follows: 
(1) Specify the simple Taylor rule, which is an instrument rule; 
52 
 
(2) Assume that the central bank commits to the simple Taylor rule, therefore, we 
substitute the simple Taylor rule into NK-IS for 𝑖𝑡; 
(3) Derive Thurston’s (2010,2012) general solutions of target variables output gap and 
inflation rate; 
(4) Specify the policy objective function as a loss function described by periodical 
weighted sum of the variances of the general solutions of output gap and inflation. 
Periodical because interest rate is adjusted period-by-period according to the values of 
𝑥 and 𝜋 in each period; 
(5) Derive the optimal linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the simple Taylor rule by using 
the first partial derivative test; 
(6) Determine the limit of optimal L (as expressed by equation (24)) at 𝜑𝑥 approaching 
infinity is a minimum by comparing it with the optimal L (as expressed by equation 
(21)) for all 𝜑𝑥 ∈ (−∞,∞).   
I then find the optimal linear relationship between 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 under the commitment to the 
simple Taylor rule is the same as the one under the three-term Taylor rules.   
When 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 approach infinity, the limit value of the central-bank loss function under 
the commitment to the simple Taylor is the same as the minimized loss function under the three-
term Taylor rule.  Note that I am not suggesting that the Fed can force 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 to approach 
infinity.  It is only for the comparison purpose not for the practical reason by letting 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 
approach infinity when we want to know the performance of different Taylor rules.  When the 
performance of a Taylor rule is improved, the minimized social welfare loss containing such 
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Taylor rule will be reduced and move close to the minimized social welfare loss containing the 
three-term Taylor rule.  I will discuss this application in details in Chapter 3.  
2.5 Appendixes 
2.5.1 Deriving the Optimal Loci for 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅 
Using the optimal paths of output gap, 
𝑥𝑡 = −
𝑘
𝑘2 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝜌)
𝑢𝑡 , 
and inflation rate, 
𝜋𝑡 =
𝛤
𝑘2 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝜌)
𝑢𝑡 
for the discretionary case from Thurston (2010, 2012),28 and let 
𝜑𝑔 = 𝜎 
for nullifying g-shocks, the current output gap and inflation rate is then only affected by u-
                                                 














and the forward looking expectation of inflation rate at steady state, 
𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] = 𝜌𝜋𝑡 . 
Substituting 𝑥𝑡 = −
𝑘
𝛤
𝜋𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] = 𝜌𝑢𝑡 into the Phillips equation 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] + 𝑢𝑡, and solving for 
𝜋𝑡, I obtain the optimal path of inflation rate for discretionary case:  
𝜋𝑡 =
𝛤
𝑘2 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝜌)
𝑢𝑡 . 
 I then also obtain the optimal path of output gap for discretionary case: 
𝑥𝑡 = −
𝑘
𝑘2 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝜌)
𝑢𝑡 





shocks , so I can assume 𝐸𝑡[𝑥𝑡+1] = 𝜌𝑥𝑡 and 𝐸𝑡[𝜋𝑡+1] = 𝜌𝜋𝑡 at steady state.  Substituting all of 
the above equations into the baseline new Keynesian IS equation described in Chapter 1 section 









is obtained by simplifying and rearranging the equation.29  
 
2.5.2 Deriving the (Pre-commitment) Optimal Loci for 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅 in Maple 
The Maple commands in italics for obtaining the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 in the case of a 
central bank’s commitment to the particular Taylor rule are as follow: 
The NK-IS: 
 
Note: EX is   and EP is , EX and EP are forward-looking variables. The demand shock, , 




Note: The cost shock, , is an AR(1) process . 
The particular Taylor Rule: 
 
Solving Baseline NKM by Undetermined Coefficient Method : 
                                                 
29 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝜌𝑥𝑡 −
1
𝜎
(𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜎𝑔𝑡 − 𝜌𝜋𝑡) 
⟹ [(1 − 𝜌)𝜎 + 𝜑𝑥]𝑥𝑡 = (𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋)𝜋𝑡  
⟹ [(1 − 𝜌)𝜎 + 𝜑𝑥] �
−𝑘
𝑘2 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝜌)
� 𝑢𝑡 = (𝜌 − 𝜑𝜋) �
𝛤
𝑘2 + 𝛤(1 − 𝛽𝜌)
� 𝑢𝑡  













































2.5.3 The Messy Results of the Optimal Loci for 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅 in Maple 





Figure 2.4. The Maple Result (1) of the Optimal Loci for 𝝋𝒙 and 𝝋𝝅 
 
Figure 2.5 below is the screenshot which Maple produces no result for the linear 
relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋: 
 
Maple produces the messy result of 
the linear relationship of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋. 
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2.5.4 Deriving the General Solutions in Maple 
This appendix shows the Maple commands for obtaining the general solutions of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 by 
using the baseline NKM which has the simple Taylor rule.  The Maple commands in italics for 
the general solutions of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 are as follow: 
In this case, the simple Taylor rule (STR) is   , which does not have φ[g] in it. 
Baseline IS curve (BIS) expresses a NK-IS equation and is presented by (1) below: 
 
Note: EX is   and EP is , EX and EP are forward-looking variables. The demand 
shock, , is an AR(1) process . 
 
Baseline Philips curve (BPC) expresses a NK-PC equation and is presented by (2) below:  
 
Note: The cost shock, , is an AR(1) process . 
Maple cannot produce the solution for 




The simple Taylor Rule (STR) expresses a Taylor rule using actual values of x and π and is presented 
by (3) below: 
 
 




Obtaining the general solutions of x and π by solving (4) and (5) using the Baseline NKM (1) and (2), and 
the simple Taylor Rule (3) : 
 
Equation (6) below shows x is updated one period ahead: 
 
 
Equation (7) below shows π is updated one period ahead: 
 
 
Equation (8) below shows g[t+1] and u[t+1] in (6) are replaced by λg[t]+ε[t+1] and ρu[t]+η[t+1]: 
 
 
Equation (9) below shows g[t+1] and u[t+1] in (7) are replaced by λg[t]+ε[t+1] and ρu[t]+η[t+1]: 
 
 
Equation (10) below shows the undetermined coefficient equation of EX in the Baseline NKM: 
 
Note: The expected values of  and    are equal to zero. 
 
Equation (11) below shows the undetermined coefficient equation of EP in the Baseline NKM: 
 
Note: The expected values of  and    are equal to zero. 
 
Equation (12) below shows the x and π in STR (3) are replaced by (6) and (7): 
 
 
Equation (13) below shows x, i, EX and EP in Baseline IS (1) are replaced by (6), (12), (10) and (11): 
 
 
Equation (14) below shows x, π and EP in Baseline Philips curve (2) are replaced by (6), (7) and (11): 
 
 











Below is the general solution of x when the simple TR does not have φ[g] in it. 




Below is the general solution of π when the simple TR does not have φ[g] in it. 




To run the commands and produce equations (4) and equations (5) in Maple, simply copy and 
paste all the commands into Maple and run the commands. 
2.5.5 The Relationship between (11a) and minimum L: Illustrations from 2-D 
Plots 
I take 𝜑𝑥 fixed to the yellow surface and then increase 𝜑𝜋 to see where the minimum is, and I 
reproduce the u-shaped curve with different values of 𝜑𝑥.  I also found the curve repeatedly 
narrowed down the range of movement of 𝜑𝜋.  Note that because L is a fraction, there are 
rounding problems in the results, the points where minimum L occurs can be a little off from the 
predictive point as (11a) suggests. 
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First is an example with 𝜑𝑥 = 2 and the Maple command: 
Plot(subs(phi[x]=2, Lsimu1), phi[pi]=5.1..5.3) 
 




Third, I try the first derivative with respect to 𝜑𝜋 to see where it crosses the zero line.  The 





Then inserted (11a)’s predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 into the first derivative: 
>  
 
This is very close to zero. 
Next I check the “inverse ridge” case for showing that (11a) is working in both directions.  First I 
rearrange (11a) to (11a’): . 
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Then the parameterization of (11a’) is  .  I found a u-shaped 
curve and repeatedly narrowed down the range of movement of 𝜑𝑥.  To be consistent with the 
previous example of taking 𝜑𝑥 fixed to the yellow (unconstrained) surface, I chose 𝜑𝜋 =
5.195114006 as the inverse example and command:  
>  
 






Thirdly, I tried the first derivative with respect to 𝜑𝑥 to see where it crosses the 0 line:  
>  
 
It seems like the 𝜑𝑥 crosses the 0 line a bit off 2.01.  Then insert (11a’)’s predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 
into the first derivative: 
>  
 
Again, this seems pretty close to zero. 
Now, I repeat above steps using big value of 𝜑𝑥 for the example of taking 𝜑𝑥 fixed and big value 









Then, I try the first derivative with respect to 𝜑𝜋 to see where it crosses the zero line.  The Maple 





Then insert (11a)’s predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 into the first derivative: 
>  
 
The result −3.929585173 ∗ 10−7 is very close to zero.  The predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 for taking 𝜑𝑥 
fixed at big value is more accurate than the previous predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 for taking 𝜑𝑥 fixed at 
small value. 





The minimum is a little bit short of 𝜑𝑥 = 20.  I then calculate the implied value by (11a’), it is a 
little bit off: 
>  
 





It seems like the 𝜑𝑥 crosses the zero line at 20.  Then insert (11a’)’s predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 into 
the first derivative: 
>  
 
Again, this seems pretty close to zero. 
Finally, I show a proof that (11a) is the condition for having a minimum loss of equation (7).  
First, I pick 𝜑𝑥,𝑠𝑚𝑥 = 2 and treat it as exogenous. Then I derive the first derivative of equation 








Second, I solve 𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜑𝜋
= 0 for minimizing 𝜑𝜋 and the Maple command: 
>  
 
Third, I calculate predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 of (11a) when 𝜑𝑥 = 2: 
>  
 
The predicted value of 𝜑𝜋 is a bit off. 
Next, I pick 𝜑𝜋,𝑠𝑚𝑥 = 2 and treat it as exogenous. Then I derive the first derivative of equation 






Then I solve 𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜑𝑥





Finally, I calculate predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 of (11a) when 𝜑𝜋 = 2: 
>  
 
The predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 is a bit off. 







The predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 is still a bit off, but the two values of 𝜑𝑥 are more close to each other.  









The predicted value of 𝜑𝑥 is almost identical to the solution of 
𝑑𝐿
𝑑𝜑𝑥
= 0 for minimizing 𝜑𝑥.   
















Two examples of negative values of 𝜑𝜋,𝑠𝑚𝑥 and 𝜑𝑥,𝑠𝑚𝑥 also show that (11a) is the condition for 
having a minimum loss of equation (7). 
 











2.5.7 The Second Partial Derivative Test of  the Social Welfare Loss (7) 




(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2(𝛽𝜆 − 1)2







(𝛽𝜆 − 1)2(−2 + (𝜆 + 𝜌)𝛽)3(𝜌 − 𝜆)3(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥)2𝛽3
𝜎𝜂2, 





(−2 + (𝜆 + 𝜌)𝛽)3(𝜌 − 𝜆)3(𝜌𝜎 − 𝜎 − 𝜑𝑥)2𝛽3
𝜎𝜂2. 30 











 must be 




















                                                 
30 g-shocks are nullified for the simplicity of the expression of equations. 
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3 USING MONEY SIGNALS TO IMPROVE TAYLOR RULE 








This chapter is the study of a combination monetary policy rule where the central bank 
(“the Fed”) sets the interest rate before observing current shocks of output gap (𝑥𝑡) and inflation 
(𝜋𝑡).  The missing information is 𝜀𝑡 in the shock term of 𝑥𝑡 equation—i.e., 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑡 where 𝜀𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁 (0,𝜎𝜀2), and 𝜂𝑡 in the shock term of 𝜋𝑡 equation—i.e., 𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 +
𝜂𝑡  where 𝜂𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁 �0,𝜎𝜂2�.  Thus, the Fed cannot adjust their interest rate for those shocks 
because the Fed cannot observe 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡.  On the other hand, the information of money is 
immediately available to the Fed when I use a model as the abstract representation of the Fed’s 
observation of money surprise, so the Fed can use signals about money to adjust their interest 
rate.  My model of the Fed’s operation on how they observe money surprise is a simplified 
model for making a theoretical point, not for the purpose of improving what the Fed is actually 
doing.  The combination policy of a Taylor rule and money signal can improve the social welfare 
loss when the Fed sets their monetary policy with unobservable shocks.  Chapter 3 uses an 
inverted version of Poole’s (1970) combination policy analysis and shows that the social welfare 




In the previous two chapters, I discuss the mechanism of the baseline new Keynesian monetary 
model (“NKM”) for the analysis of monetary policy and potentially the performance of monetary 
policy.  Conventionally speaking, the baseline NKM has a full-information Taylor rule built in 
and all the shocks are assumed to be known when a central bank (“the Fed”) sets its monetary 
policy, as well as the model parameters, so it is less complicated for not using money demand 
and supply analysis.  CGG (1999) argues that (a): “Using observable intermediate targets, such 
as broad money aggregates are a possibility, but experience suggests that these indirect indicators 
are generally too unstable to be used in practice.” (CGG 1999, p.1686)  (b): “Large unobservable 
shocks to money demand produce high volatility of interest rates when a monetary aggregate is 
used as the policy instrument.  It is largely for this reason that an interest rate instrument may be 
preferable.” (CGG 1999, p.1687)  Their two arguments are based on their summary that the 
policy results are the same whether the Fed uses a money-based or interest rate based model.  
There is no necessary choice between money based on interest rate or interest rate based on 
money. (CGG 1999, p.1667)31 
However when the Fed only has limited observation about target variables—i.e., output 
gaps and inflation rates—, the Fed cannot adjust their interest rate for the missing information in 
those target variables because they cannot observe them.  Basically the missing information is 
                                                 
31 If the shocks are fully observed then it does not matter whether the monetary policy model is money based on 
interest rate or interest rate based on money.  I am not claiming that high volatility of interest rates is a bad thing.  In 
this context the only thing those authors did not prefer about monetary aggregate policy is that it requires more 
information and is more complicated. 
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the components of output gap and inflation and those are not observed, so using a Taylor rule the 
Fed is not able to respond to those components of output gap and inflation.  For example, 
observed target variables cannot take into account of unobservable shocks and estimated target 
variables are simply ignore the unobservable shocks.  Obviously Taylor rule performance will be 
worse if the Fed has limited information about 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡.  In this chapter I want to know how the 
Fed can improve the performance of limited-information Taylor rule.  
William Poole (1970) proposed a combination policy when a certain relationship was 
maintained between interest rate and money stock using a fixed-price, IS-LM model: 
�
𝑦 = 𝑝0 − 𝑝1𝑖 + 𝜖𝑦
𝑦 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝑀 + 𝑏2𝑖 + 𝜖𝑠
, 
where 𝑦 is output, 𝑖 is interest rate, 𝑀 is money, 𝜖𝑦 is output shock and 𝜖𝑠 is money shock.  His 
combination policy is depending on the optimal decision, which he proposed (p.204), from “the 
policy that minimizes the expected loss from failure of the level of income to equal the desired 
level.”  He suggests that using a combination policy, so that the Fed respond to the information it 
receives from the variation of interest rate in order to adjust money target.  Let 𝑀 = 𝐵𝑖, where M 
is money, i is interest rate, B is the coefficient and Bi is the response of M to the new information 
about i, so that the Fed can use information from the variation of the interest rate.  Find the value 






Note that there are two special cases of this optimal B which I left out in this chapter.  When 
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there is no IS shock (𝜎𝑦2 = 0): 𝐵∗ → ∞, this is the pure interest rate targeting.  When there is no 
LM shock (𝜎𝑠2 = 0): 𝐵∗ = −
𝑢2
𝑢1
, this is an aggressive money supply targeting.   
On the other hand, we can have the “inverted” Poole combination policy that the Fed 
knows32 the amount of money (e.g., nonborrowed reserves) it is letting in and out in order to 
reach a particular interest rate objective.  That is we let 𝑖 = 𝛩𝑀 where 𝛩 is the coefficient and 
𝛩𝑀 is the response of i to the new information about M—so that the Fed adjusts interest rate 
relative to its planned value when the Fed observes the money movement from its expected value.  
In other words, the Fed uses its observation of how much it is unexpectedly changing the money 
supply aggregate in order to reach the target.33  Find the value of Θ (and call it optimal Θ) that 





 It is actually the reciprocal of the optimal B.  Furthermore, the minimum variance of output y is 
exactly the same as the original Poole combination policy.  In other words, “Poole’s combination 
policy can be turned on its head,”—i.e., an inverted version of original Poole’s (1970) 
combination policy—, and get the same result.    
In this chapter, I apply the inverted version of Poole’s (1970) combination policy analysis 
from traditional IS-LM model to the new Keynesian Model.  I formulate a combination Taylor 
                                                 
32 This is an abstract representation of the Fed’s observation of money surprise.  The assumption of the Fed’s 
operation on how they observe money surprise is simplified for making theoretical point, not for the purpose of 
improving what the Fed is actually doing. 
33 The value of money supply is determined by the condition that money demand equals money supply (i.e., an LM 
curve).  When money demand is changed from realized shocks so does the value of the money supply. 
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rule where 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑖𝑡] is the Taylor rule value of 𝑖𝑡 based on t-1 projection of inflation and output, 
i.e., 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑥𝑡] and 𝐸𝑡−1[𝜋𝑡].  But there is an optimal adjustment based on the 𝑀𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1[𝑀𝑡] 
which the Fed finds it has to use in order to keep the interest rate on the desire path.  Since the 
unobserved shocks are i.i.d, this combination Taylor rule component is orthogonal to t-1 
information, so is just an “add on” to the Taylor rule with this new component.   
Note that the model of 𝑀𝑡 derived in the section 3.4 is an abstract representation of the 
Fed’s observation of money surprise, so the Fed can use signals about money to adjust their 
interest rate.  My model of the Fed’s operation on how it observes money surprise is a simplified 
model for making theoretical point, not for the purpose of improving what the Fed is actually 
doing. 
In short, this paper is the analysis of signal problem when the Fed cannot adjust interest 
rate according to a Taylor rule and only the signals from money are immediately available for the 
Fed.  In this paper solutions to the questions are determined within the context of the baseline 
new Keynesian model.  The questions arise as a result of the fact that the Fed operates through a 
Taylor rule but only is able to observe the lag components of output gap and inflation.  Since the 
Fed is not able to respond to the missing components of output gap and inflation because those 
components are not observed by the Fed, and as the result, the expected social welfare loss is 
higher than its minimum value.   
The analysis produces two major findings.  First, it is possible to construct a combination 
rule in which the constraint on the parameters of the two rule variables—output gap and 
inflation—maintained in a certain relationship to each other and to show that the optimal 
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combination rule is as good as or superior to the simple Taylor rule which has the signal problem.  
Later I will show how much benefit we get from the combination rule.  Second, signals coming 
from unexpected quantity changes in money (i.e., the money signals) help to improve the simple 
Taylor rule performance.  CGG (1999)’s two arguments (a-b) cannot be the reasons for not using 
the money signals.  High variance of money demand and supply shocks will clearly reduce the 
information value of money surprises, but the Fed can still improve the Taylor rule performance 
from using money signals with high variance. 
In Chapter 2, I have discussed the properties of full-information Taylor rules: a three-term 
Taylor rule and a simple (“two-term”) Taylor rule.  In Section 3.2, I continue the use of the 
symbolic expression of Taylor rules from Chapter 2 for comparing the performance of three 
Taylor rules which are two full-information Taylor rules and one limited-information Taylor rule.  
The performance is measured by the social welfare losses of these three rules.  𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑  is the 
social welfare loss with the (full-information) three-term Taylor rule built in, which I used in the 
Chapter 2.  𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the social welfare loss with the (full-information) two-term Taylor rule 
built in, which is the simple Taylor rule in the Chapter 2.  𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠 is the social welfare loss with 
the (limited-information) two-term Taylor rule built in, which is the simple Taylor rule in 
Chapter 2 with expected values of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 built in.  See Table 3.1 for specifications of these 
labels of social welfare loss.  Since the three-term Taylor rule is impractical or “unrealistic” to 
expect the Fed bases a rule on a shock term.  𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑 is only a benchmark for comparison 
purpose.  The case for (limited-information) three-term Taylor rule is left in the Appendix 3.9.2 
for interested readers.  The focus in this chapter is the simple Taylor rule.  Section 3.3 is the 
section of the cause of the difference in loss between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠.  I then show how to 
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derive the signals from money for constructing a combination rule in Section 3.4.  In Section 3.5, 
I show the construction of the combination rule and its performance as well as the impact of the 
interest elasticity to the money signals.  In Section 3.6, I will discuss the influence of the 
variance of money demand to the money signals and to the performance of the combination rule.  
Section 3.7 presents an example for measuring Taylor rule improvement from the money signals 
with the parameters used in literature.  Section 3.8 is the conclusion.  Section 3.9 consists of the 
appendixes. 




Loss Function Taylor Rule 
𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑  𝐿 =
1
2
(𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡  
𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠  𝐿 =
1
2
(𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡  
𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠  𝐿 =
1
2
(𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2) 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝐸𝑡−1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝐸𝑡−1𝜋𝑡  
Note: 𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 −
1
𝜎
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑔𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑡  
3.2 The Performance of Three Taylor Rules in the Baseline NKM 
I start from comparing the performance of three different Taylor rules in the context of the 
baseline new Keynesian model for the analysis of monetary policy.  This model contains two 
equations.  The first is the equation of output gap (i.e., the difference between current output 𝑦𝑡 
and the output in full-employment 𝑦𝑡
𝑓) from the new Keynesian IS curve, 
𝑥𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 −
1
𝜎
(𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑔𝑡,                                                                                         (1) 
where 𝑔𝑡 = 𝜆𝑔𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 is the first order autocorrelation process with the innovation 
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𝜀𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁(0,𝜎𝜀2).  The second is the equation of inflation (i.e., the difference between price in 
current period 𝑝𝑡 and price in previous period 𝑝𝑡−1) from the new Keynesian Phillips Curve, 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝑘𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝑢𝑡 ,                                                                                                            (2) 
where 𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑡 is the first order autocorrelation process with the innovation 
𝜂𝑡~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁�0,𝜎𝜂2�.   
Then we substitute three different Taylor rules into (1) for 𝑖𝑡 based on the assumption of 
commitment to the simple Taylor rule as we showed in Chapter 2.  The first is the three-term 
Taylor rule (𝑇𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑), in which Woodford (2001) argued that 𝜑𝑔 (= 𝜎) term should be added: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡,                                                                                                            (3) 
the second is the simple Taylor rule (𝑇𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) from Chapter 2: 
𝚤̃𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡.                                                                                                                           (4) 
These two rules are full-information rules for which use actual values of output gap and inflation.  
The third is an expected simple Taylor rule (𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠): 
𝚤̂𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝐸𝑡−1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝐸𝑡−1𝜋𝑡,                                                                                                          (5) 
(5) is the limited-information Taylor rule for which uses expected values of output gap and 
inflation.  In appendix 3.9.2, I discuss a case which involves a Taylor rule which is equation (5) 
plus an additional term 𝜑𝑔𝐸𝑡−1𝑔𝑡.  After separately substituting (3), (4) and (5) into (1) for 𝑖𝑡,  
we substitute the general solutions34 of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 from solving (1) and (2) into the period 
quadratic loss function 
                                                 






𝐸[𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2]                                                                                                                         (6) 
and we obtain three social welfare functions 𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑 , 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠 in terms of (3), (4) 







+ 𝜌,                                                                                 (7) 
for the minimum social welfare losses of 𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑 , 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠  by using the first order 
conditions from differentiating 𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑 , 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠 with respect to 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋.  
Next, we substitute (7) into 𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑 , 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 and 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠 and we obtain three minimum 






𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2











(𝛤(𝛽𝜆 − 1)2 + 𝑘2)𝜎2
𝐷2







𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2




(𝛤(𝛽𝜆 − 1)2 + 𝑘2)𝜎2
𝐷2
+ 𝑘2 + 𝛤�𝜎𝜀2,          (8c) 





+ 𝜌� + (1 − 𝛽𝜆)𝜑𝑥 + (𝜆 − 1)(𝛽𝜆 − 1)𝜎 − 𝑘𝜌.  Figure 
3.1 compares the differences of these three minimum social welfare losses as 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 
approach infinity.  Note that I am not suggesting that the Fed can force 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 to approach 
infinity.  It is for the comparison purpose not for the practical reason by letting 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 
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approach infinity.  I want to see whether any optimal35 combination of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋, especially 
when the values of such 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 are very big, the performance of Taylor rules are improved or 
not.  If 𝜑𝑥 is approaching infinity then 𝐷2 term in the denominator of (8c) is approaching infinity, 
and the second term in (8c) approaches zero, as the figure 3.1 shows the difference in loss 
between 𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑,𝑠𝑠𝑚 and 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 can be completely eliminated by having 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 
approach infinity.36  However, the figure 3.1 also shows that we cannot reduce the difference in 
loss between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 and 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚by using the same trick. 
                                                 
35 That is the linear relationship between 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 which guarantee optimal paths of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡, as well as 
minimum social welfare loss. 
36 For the discussion of the relationship between 𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑,𝑠𝑠𝑚  and 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 see Huang (2017). 
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Figure 3.1. Three Minimized Social Welfare Losses 
 
3.3 What Makes the Difference between 𝑳𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔𝒔,𝒔𝒔𝒎 and 𝑳𝒖𝒎𝒖𝒖𝒔,𝒔𝒔𝒎 
The comparison of 𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑,𝑠𝑠𝑚 and 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 using two full-information Taylor rules, 
𝑇𝑅𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑 and 𝑇𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, were studied in the previous chapter.  Here the focus is on the loss 
difference between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 and 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚.  Let 𝑥�𝑡 and 𝜋�𝑡 are the output gap and inflation 
when the Fed does not adjust its interest rate to 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡.  The following two equations must be 
true since none of the t-1 variables changes, and because 𝜀 and 𝜂 are orthogonal to everything, 
and because the shocks to output gap and inflation will be 𝜀 and 𝑘𝜀 + 𝜂 when 𝜀 and 𝜂 are 
unobserved: 




𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋�𝑡 = 𝑘𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 ,                                                                                                                     (9b) 
where 𝑥�t is the expected value of current period’s output gap and 𝜋�𝑡 is the expected value of 
current period’s inflation.  We then name 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑥�𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷 and 𝜋𝑡 − 𝜋�𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷 and substitute DX 












(𝑘2 + 𝛤)𝜎𝜀2 +
1
2
𝜎𝜂2.                                                                                                       (10) 
This loss difference, as we show in Figure 3.1, is the result when the Fed sets the interest rate 
before observing current variables of output gap and inflation which contains information of 
shocks 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡.  In other words, the Fed commits to 𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠.  In this situation the Fed cannot 
adjust its interest rate for those shocks according to 𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠.  On the other hand, the information 
of money is immediately available to the Fed, so the Fed can use the signals coming from 
unexpected quantity changes in money, which we can simply call it the money signal, to adjust 
their interest rate.  In the next section, we will show how to derive the money signal and use it to 
develop a combination policy rule for reducing DL. 
3.4 Derivation of the Money Signal 
As Figure 3.1 shows, the difference in loss between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 and 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 cannot be 
reduced by using different set of optimal values of 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋, or even when these values are 
forced to approach infinity.  Thus using the money signals are the simple and direct way to 
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reduce the difference in loss between 𝐿𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 and 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 when new information about 𝜀𝑡 
and 𝜂𝑡 are unobserved.  Here we show that the money signals are actually a linear function of 𝜀𝑡 
and 𝜂𝑡.  First we recall the output gap is defined as the difference between current output (𝑦𝑡) 
and the output in full-employment (𝑦𝑡
𝑓), i.e., 𝑥𝑡 = 𝑦𝑡 − 𝑦𝑡
𝑓, and inflation is defined as the 
difference between price in current period (𝑝𝑡) and in previous period (𝑝𝑡−1), i.e., 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡−1.  
Second, we apply the log-linearized Euler condition of money and consumption: 






𝑖𝑡 + 𝛺𝑡 ,                                                                                                      (11) 
where 1/𝑏 is the semi interest elasticity37 of money demand and 𝛺 is the money demand shock 
which is also the first order autocorrelation process with the innovation 𝜔~𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁(0,𝜎𝜛2 ).  
Substituting 𝑝𝑡 in (11) by 𝜋𝑡 + 𝑝𝑡−1 and 𝑦𝑡 in (11) by 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑦𝑡
𝑓 from our definition of output gap 
and inflation, and then substituting 𝑥𝑡 by 𝑥�𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷 and 𝜋𝑡 by 𝜋�𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷 from the discussion in 
section 3.3, we then obtain the money equation as 
𝑙𝑡 = 𝜋�𝑡 + 𝐷𝐷 + 𝑝𝑡−1 +
𝜎
𝑏




𝑖𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡.                                                   (12) 
Finally, we obtain the money signals by subtracting the expected value of (12) from (12) as 
𝑙𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡−1𝑙𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷 +
𝜎
𝑏
(𝐷𝐷) + 𝜔𝑡 
= 𝑘𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 +
𝜎
𝑏




� 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡,                                                                                   (13) 
                                                 




�.  Walsh (2003, 
p.57): “Empirical work often estimates money-demand equations in which the log of real money balances is a 
function of log income and the level of nominal interest rate.  The coefficient on the nominal interest is then equal to 
the semielasticity of money demand with respect to nominal interest rate.” 
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where all the shock terms 𝜀𝑡, 𝜂𝑡 and 𝜔𝑡 are independent.  (13) is the difference in value between 
actual money demand and the expectation of money demand, and it will be used to improve 
𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠’s performance because the money signals are constituted by the shocks which are not 
included in 𝑇𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠.   
We are now ready to turn to the next section for the combination policy rule using the 
money signals—i.e., I add the money signals and its coefficient 𝜑𝑠 in the simple Taylor rule.  
The discussion in the next section is a way of explaining how the money signals permits the Fed 
to improve their perception of the actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡.  In the next section I am finding the optimal 
value of 𝜑𝑠 at its optimal setting.  This is telling us the optimal response to the interest rate from 
new information that comes from the money surprise.  We could less elegantly do it in two steps: 
find the “best” revision of 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡, then insert them into the 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 solutions to find the 
optimal interest rate adjustment.  By deriving the optimal 𝜑𝑠 I am doing all this in one step. 
3.5 The Combination Policy Rule and its Performance 
Before I get into details, one thing needs to be clarified.  The focus is on the simple Taylor rule 
for this chapter, and the reason is that it is impractical or “unrealistic” to expect the Fed bases a 
rule on a shock term.  It is the same reason for discussing the properties of the simple Taylor rule 
in Chapter 2.  The three-term Taylor rule is only a benchmark for comparison purpose.  For 
interested readers, Appendix 3.9.2 provides the discussion of a combination policy with the 
three-term Taylor rule built in.   
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Let 𝑇𝑅𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑠 express a combination policy rule from combining (5) and (13) which its 
equation is shown as 
𝚤̃𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝐸𝑡−1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝐸𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠 ��𝑘 +
𝜎
𝑏
� 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡� .                                             (14) 






















𝜎𝜂2.                                   (15) 
The symbol ^ on DL is for distinguishing (15) from (10).  Since the constraint on 𝜑𝑥 and 𝜑𝜋 is 
unique, we can simply substitute this difference in loss 𝐷𝐿�  for DL into 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠, and then we 
obtain the social welfare loss 𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑠 as 



















𝜑𝑠2 �𝜎𝜛2 .                                                                                                 (16) 
 If the value of 𝜑𝑠 is zero in (16), 𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑠 becomes 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 (i.e., equation (8c)).  The 
minimum value of (16), i.e., 𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 will be obtained when  
𝜑𝑠 =
𝜎𝑏(𝑏𝑘 + 𝜎)𝜎𝜀2




(𝑏𝑘 + 𝜎)�1 + 𝑏
2




,                                                                                    (17) 
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and this analytical value of 𝜑𝑠38, as expected from the demonstration of the “inverted” Poole 
combination policy in section 3.1, has 𝜑𝑠 to vary inversely with the variance of 𝜔, 𝜂 and 𝜀.  
When the value of 𝜎𝜛2  is very large so the value of 𝜑𝑠 is very close to zero, in this situation, 
there are not much of money signals for the improvement of the Fed’s perception of the actual 𝜀𝑡 
and 𝜂𝑡.  The validity of equation (17) can be examined by assuming there is only 𝑔𝑡 shock (this 
implied that 𝜎𝜂2 = 0 and 𝜎𝜛2 = 0) and then the loss is eliminated when I substitute the equation 
(17) in the equation (14) for 𝜑𝑠.  This implies that the money signals are able to eliminate the 
difference in the social welfare losses which caused by unobserved 𝜀𝑡.  In other words, when 
money signals of 𝜀𝑡 is used with the optimal 𝜑𝑠 (17), the value of equation (10) is equal to zero 
for only having one shock 𝜀𝑡.  A similar result also applies to the case when only unobserved 𝜂𝑡 
happens in the model economy. 
Figure 3.2 shows the improvement of social welfare loss from the money signals.  
𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 is the minimum social welfare loss with the money signals when the unit shock39 of 
money demand exists.  𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 is smaller than 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 which is the social welfare loss 
with the expected simple Taylor rule described in the section 3.2.   
                                                 
38 Solving 𝜕𝐿𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜑𝑐
= 0 for 𝜑𝑠, we obtain (17).  Since all variables have optimal settings, (17) is optimal. 
39 The variance of money demand 𝜎𝜛2  equals to one. 
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Figure 3.2. The Improvement of Social Welfare Loss 
 
Note: b is assumed with value equal to 0.5.  All parameter values are the same as used in the section 2. 
It is clear from Figure 3.2 that we cannot bring down 𝐿𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 to 𝐿𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑑,𝑠𝑠𝑚 by using 
different sets of optimal 𝜑′𝑠 or forcing the optimal 𝜑′𝑠 higher.  The only way to improve the 
social welfare loss when using the expected simple Taylor rule is by applying the money signals 
for improving the Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡.  In appendix 3.9.2, I compare and discuss 
the improvement of social welfare losses for a case in which the Taylor rule contains the 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡 
term.  
For simplicity, the special case for the 𝜑𝑠 can be also shown as 
𝜑𝑠 =
𝜎𝑏(𝑏𝑘 + 𝜎)
(𝑏𝑘 + 𝜎)2 + 𝑏2
                                                                                                              (18) 
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when we arbitrarily let �𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛2 � 𝜎𝜀2⁄ = 1 in (17).40  This special case can be used for 
understanding the relationship among minimized social welfare losses, 𝜑𝑠 and 𝑏.  The special 
case is only for comparison purpose.  In reality the value of 𝜑𝑠 is affected by the variance of 
shocks.  Figure 3.9.1 in the Appendix 3.9 shows that 𝜑𝑠 is always greater than zero and its value 
has a limit when 𝑏 approaches infinity by using equation (18). 41  Since 𝑏 is the inverse of 
interest semi-elasticity of money demand, the bigger the value of 𝑏 the smaller the interest semi-
elasticity will be.  The long time debate on the stability of money demand42 through the different 
estimated values of interest elasticity of money demand should not affect the improvement of the 
Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 by using money signals when the coefficient of money 





















(𝑏𝑘 + 𝜎)2 + 𝑏2
. 
41 The value of  𝜑𝑠  is determined by the inverse of the interest rate semi-elasticity 𝑏, which is the factor for the 
stability of money demand.   𝜑𝑠 will equal to zero only when 𝑏 = 0 or −
𝜎
𝑘
.  Since 𝑏 > 0 from our derivation of 
money demand in section 3.4, 𝜑𝑠 > 0.  The unstable money demand is associated with high interest elasticity 
according to Teles and Zhou (2005, p.52)’s observation of Ball (2001): “Ball (2001) argues that the data after 1987 
represent evidence against a stable money demand.  He estimates a linear relationship between logarithm of real 
money, the logarithm of output, and a nominal interest rate for subperiods of 1903-94.  For the period 1903-87 the 
evidence is consistent with a stable relationship with a unitary income elasticity and a relatively high interest 
elasticity, as shown by Lucas (1988) and Stock and Watson (1993).  However, the need to account for the low 
reaction of M1 to lower interest rates and higher output after 1980 lowers both the estimated interest elasticity and 
income elasticity.  The relatively low income and interest elasticity in the postwar period (1974-94) are significantly 
different from the unitary income elasticity and relatively high interest elasticity in the prewar period (1903-45), 
leading Ball to argue against a stable long run money demand.” 
42 Walsh (2010, pp. 48-52) 
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signal 𝜑𝑠 has different values of 𝑏 built in.  The relatively interest inelastic money demand43 
implied by 𝑏 approaching infinity does not play an important role for stopping using the money 
signals. 
3.6 The Effectiveness of Money Signals 
Whether the Fed can respond to unobservable shocks through the money signals is important for 
the performance of its monetary policy rule.  The effectiveness of the money signals is therefore 
the key to the combination policy performance.  At the end of Section 3.5, I discussed the value 
of 𝑏 only have limited impact to the money signals.  In this section, I study the impact of 𝜎𝜛2  to 
the money signals and to the performance of the combination policy rule.  
3.6.1  How is 𝝋𝒔 Working in the Combination Policy? 
The 𝜑𝑠 is the optimal response coefficient of the interest rate to the money surprise.  How does 
the Fed infer unobserved 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 from the money signals?  The Fed controls the money supply 




𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡.  The information content of the money signals are then used to indicate 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 as 
follows.  The estimated coefficient of 𝜎𝜀2 conditional on �𝑘 +
𝜎
𝑢
� 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡 is  
𝑝�1 = 𝐶𝑜𝐶 �𝜀𝑡, �𝑘 +
𝜎
𝑏
� 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡� 𝑉𝑝𝑟 ��𝑘 +
𝜎
𝑏









𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛2 � , 
                                                 
43 “The key point is that money demand shocks can induce volatile behavior of interest rates.  This is particularly 
true if money demand is relatively interest inelastic in the short run, as is the case for bank reserves….It is for this 




𝜎�𝜀2 = 𝐸 ��1 − 𝑝�1 ��𝑘 +
𝜎
𝑏
� 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡��
2
� , 
and the estimated coefficient of  𝜎�𝜂2  conditional on �𝑘 +
𝜎
𝑢
� 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡  is that  
𝑝�2 = 𝐶𝑜𝐶 �𝜂𝑡 , �𝑘 +
𝜎
𝑏
� 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡� 𝑉𝑝𝑟 ��𝑘 +
𝜎
𝑏
� 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡�� , 





𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛2 � , 
and 





𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛2 ��
2
� , 
where 𝜎𝜀2,𝜎𝜂2 and 𝜎𝜛2  are the variances of output gap, inflation and money demand, which are 
described in the equation (17).  𝑝�1 and 𝑝�2 are the parameter values which can be estimated by the 
central bank.  When the money signals are changed by the proportional to 𝑚�1
�𝑘+𝜎𝑐�
, this indicates 





𝜎𝜀2 + 𝜎𝜂2 + 𝜎𝜛2 �.  Then the Fed can 
adjust its interest rates in response to 𝜀𝑡 by the amount which is determined by 𝜑𝑠 from the 
section 3.4.  The Fed can also adjust its interest rates in response to 𝜂𝑡 through 𝑝�2 as well.  As 
long as the variance of money demand is small, the money signals are a good tool for the Fed to 
adjust interest rates in response to the unobserved 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡.  The bigger the variance of money 
demand, the less effective the money signals will be.  When the variance of money demand 
approaches to infinity, the numerical value of the money signals are zero.  This implies that the 
money signals may not be used as signal for unobserved 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 when the variance of money 
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demand is big.  Figure 3.3 shows this negative relation among 𝜎𝜛2 , 𝑝�1 and 𝑝�2.  From the two 
expressions of information content for 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡, I can find the values changes in 𝑝�1 and 𝑝�2 when 








so the bigger the 𝜎𝜛2 , the smaller the values of 𝑝�1 and 𝑝�2 will be.  Thus, when 𝜎𝜛2  is high, the 
improvement of the Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 through money signals is low.  Figure 
3.3 shows that the values of 𝑝�1 and 𝑝�2 decrease when the value of 𝜎𝜛2  increases. 
Figure 3.3. The Money Signals and The Noise in Money Demand 
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3.6.2 The Social Welfare Loss and the “Noise” in Money Demand 
The money demand shocks affects the Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 and this is reflected 
on the minimized social welfare loss 𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 as well.  When there are no money demand 
shocks, the value of 𝜎𝜛2  equals zero.  Then the Fed’s will have the best perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 
and 𝜂𝑡 by using the money signals, and 𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 will be smaller.  Figure 3.4 below shows 
that when 𝜎𝜛2 = 0,  the minimized social welfare loss is below the minimized social welfare loss 
when 𝜎𝜛2 ≠ 0. 





3.7 A Numerical Example: Measuring Improvement from the Money Signal 
The effectiveness of the money signals is determined by optimized 𝜑𝑠, which is determined by 
parameters and 𝜎𝜀2, 𝜎𝜂2 and 𝜎𝜛2 .  And the value of 𝜑𝑠 is in part determined by the inverse of the 
interest rate elasticity 𝑏.  I examine the values of 𝑏 and 𝜎𝜛2  to L using Walsh (2010)’s parameters 
which 𝑘 = 0.05,𝛽 = 0.99,𝜎 = 1,𝜌 = 0.5 and 𝛤 = 0.25.44  For the value of 𝜎𝜛2 , I use Cooley 
and Leroy (1981)’s standard error of M1 demand 𝜎𝜛 = 0.028 which is the largest one according 
to Baba, Hendry and Starr (1992)’s survey paper.45  The values of 𝜎𝜀2 and 𝜎𝜂2 are from Ireland 
(2011)’s table 1 where he reports 𝜎𝜀 = 0.0868 and 𝜎𝜂 = 0.0017.  The value of 𝑏 is set to be 2 
based on Lucas (2000)’s estimation of 0.5 for the interest rate elasticity of money demand (M1).   
First, Figure 3.5 shows that 𝜑𝑠 is nonzero positive value at 𝑏 = 2.  This figure also implies 
that the interest rate elasticity of money demand (M1) may play less important role in monetary 
policy then conventional beliefs.  Whether the money signals are measured with a stable money 
demand to interest rates or not, the social welfare loss should be still improved by the money 
signals. 
                                                 
44 Marest and Thurston (2017) reported the parameter estimations in the literature of NKM. Their report also 
includes Walsh (2010)’s parameters.  See Table 1 in the Appendix 3.9.3 for details. 
45 See Table 2 in the Appendix 3.9.3 for details. 
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Figure 3.5. The Relationship between 𝝋𝒔 and b 
 
Note: The values of 𝝈𝜺𝟎 and 𝝈𝜼𝟎 are from Peter Ireland (2011)’s table 1, p.42.  The value of 𝝈𝝕𝟎  is from Baba, Hendry and Starr 
(1992) table 2, p.44. 
Figure 3.6 shows the improvement of minimized social welfare loss from the money 
signals.  All the social welfare losses L0, L1, L2, and L3 are from the definition in previous 
sections.  L0 curve is the optimal social welfare loss defined in section 3.2.  L1 curve shows the 
outcome of social welfare loss when 𝜑𝑔 = 0 and the existence of g-shocks defined in section 3.2.  
L2 is the loss when the Fed’s Taylor rule uses only expected values of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 defined in 
section 3.2.  L3 is the loss when the Fed uses the combination policy rule (with the money 
signals) defined in section 3.5.  L3 is below L2 which indicates the improvement of social 
welfare loss from the money signals.  Table 3 in the appendix 3.9.3 provides the definitions of L0, 
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L1, L2 and L3. Table 4 in the appendix 3.9.3 compares the improvement of the minimized social 
welfare loss to different values of 𝑏 and Γ from empirical studies.  Note that 𝑏 and 𝛤 are 
parameter values that cannot be used as instrument.   
Figure 3.6. The Improvements of L from the Money Signals 
 
The money demand shocks affects the Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 and this is 
reflected on the minimized social welfare loss 𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑠𝑚𝑠,𝑠𝑠𝑚 as well.  When demand shocks are 
big, the Fed’s perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 is worse.  Figure 3.7 shows the perception of actual 
𝜀𝑡 represented by 𝑝�1 and the perception of actual 𝜂𝑡 represented by 𝑝�2 has small values when the 
value of 𝜎𝜛2  is big. Also Figure 3.7 implies that the Fed can use money signals to improve their 
perception of actual 𝜀𝑡 and 𝜂𝑡 because the biggest value of the 𝜎𝜛 is 0.028.  Note that the 𝑝�1 
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curve is lower than 𝑝�2 curve in the Figure 3.7 but the 𝑝�1 curve is higher than 𝑝�2 curve in the 
Figure 3.3.  This is because 𝑏 = 2 in the Figure 3.7 and 𝑏 = 0.5 in the Figure 3.3. 
Figure 3.7. The Social Welfare Loss and the Money Signals 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The combination policy can improve the social welfare loss when the Fed sets its monetary 
policy with unobservable shocks.  This paper uses an inverted version of Poole’s (1970) 
combination policy analysis and shows that the social welfare loss is improved from the money 
signals.  𝑏 affects the effectiveness of the money signals, but the money signals always have non-
zero values even when b has very big values.  𝜎𝜛2  affects the money signals and the social 
welfare loss.  𝜎𝜛2  will decrease 𝜑𝑠 and raise loss to some limit.  We should use combination 
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policy as long as there is any perceptible gain, 𝜑𝑠 > 0, and the social welfare loss will be 
reduced by at least a little.   
3.9 Appendixes 
3.9.1 The Figure for the value of 𝝋𝒔 
Figure 3.8.1. shows the value of 𝜑𝑠 when 𝑏 is approaching positive (negative) infinity with 
𝑘 = 0.3,𝛽 = 0.99 and 𝜎 = 1. 







3.9.2 The Example of Using the Money Signals to Improve L when the 
Quantity of 𝝋𝒈 in Taylor Rules are not Zero 
In this example I apply the steps from section 3.2 to section 3.5 for Taylor rules whose have the 
quantity of 𝜑𝑔 not equal to zero.  These Taylor rules are TR0: 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡,                                                                                                                      (A1) 
a limited-information Taylor rule TR0’: 
𝑖𝑡′ = 𝜑𝑥𝐸𝑡−1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝐸𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝐸𝑡−1𝑔𝑡,                                                                                             (A2) 
and a combination policy rule using the money signals TR0’’: 
𝑖𝑡′′ = 𝜑𝑥𝐸𝑡−1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝐸𝑡−1𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝐸𝑡−1𝑔𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠 ��𝑘 +
𝜎
𝑏
� 𝜀𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜔𝑡� .                                  (A3) 
 Substituting these three rules (A1), (A2) and (A3) separately into (1) for 𝑖𝑡 and then solving (1) 
and (2) for 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 accordingly.  Next I substitute each set of general solutions of 𝑥𝑡 and 𝜋𝑡 
associated with (A1), (A2) and (A3) into the period quadratic loss function: 𝐿 = 1
2
𝐸[𝜋𝑡2 + 𝛤𝑥𝑡2] 
and we obtain three social welfare loss functions L0, L0’ and L0’’ associated with (A1), (A2) and 
(A3).  Separately minimizing these three social welfare loss function and solving the first-order 







+ 𝜌, and furthermore solving the first order condition for 𝜑𝑠, I 
obtain the same optimal value (17) of 𝜑𝑠: 
𝜑𝑠 =
𝜎𝑏
(𝑏𝑘 + 𝜎)�1 + 𝑏
2





Next, substituting (7) into L0, L0’ and L0’’ and substituting (17) into L0’’, I obtain three 








𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2






𝛤(𝛽𝜌 − 1)2 + 𝑘2
+ 1� 𝜎𝜂2 +
1
2
(𝑘2 + 𝛤)𝜎𝜀2,                                                                      (𝐴5) 
and 






























.    
Table 3.8.2 shows the comparison of L0, L0’ and L0’’ under the special cases.  The first 
column of Table 3.8.2 shows the performance of the combination policy rule is as good as the 
full-information Taylor rule when there are only g-shocks, so we should use the combination 
policy rule when there are only unobservable g-shocks.  The second column of Table 3.8.2 
shows that the performance of the combination policy is the same as the limited-information 
Taylor rule when there are only unobservable u-shocks.  The third column of Table 3.8.2 shows 
that the performance of combination policy rule are the same as the full-information Taylor rule 
and the limited-information Taylor rule when there are only ω-shocks.  The fourth column of 
Table 3.8.2 shows that the performance of combination policy rule is better than the limited-





Table 3.8.2. Comparison of L0, L0’ and L0’’ 
 𝜎𝜀2 = 1, 𝜎𝜂2 = 0, 𝜎𝜛2 = 0 𝜎𝜀2 = 0, 𝜎𝜂2 = 1, 𝜎𝜛2 = 0 𝜎𝜀2 = 0, 𝜎𝜂2 = 0, 𝜎𝜛2 = 1 𝜎𝜀2 = 1, 𝜎𝜂2 = 1, 𝜎𝜛2 = 1 
𝜑𝑠 0.435 0 0 0.316 
L0 0 1.667 0 1.667 
L0’ 1.045 2.167 0 3.211 
L0’’ 0 2.167 0 2.453 
Note: Assumed parameters are 𝑘 = 0.3,𝛽 = 0.99,𝛤 = 2,𝜎 = 1, 𝜆 = 0.5,𝜌 = 0.5,𝜑𝜋 = 1.5 and 𝜑𝑥 = −2.18 +
3.367𝜑𝜋 
 
3.9.3 Tables of Empirical Resources 
I reproduce Marest and Thurston (2017)’s table 3 here and I give a comment on the use of 𝛤 in 
the Note. 
Table 1 
Parameters Used in Literature 
Author Year Parameters 
  𝑘 𝛽 𝜎 Γ 𝜌 
Woodford 2003 0.024 0.99 0.16 0.003 0.4 
Billi 2008 0.024 0.9926 0.16 0.003 0.1 
Walsh 2010 0.05 0.99 1 0.25 0.5 
Note: We should ignore the small values of Γ when we compare the improvement of L.  The smaller 
the Γ, the smaller the L will be.  Small Γ  implies that the weight on output gap is small and L is less 
affected by the changes in output gap from 𝑔𝑡 .  Since the money signals improved L mainly by 
improving output gap, an almost zero weight on x sends a wrong message that the money signals 
were ineffective. 
 
I reproduce Baba, Hendry and Starr (1992) table 2 here. 
Table 2 
𝜎𝜛2  used in Literature 
Author Year Standard Error of M1 
Goldfeld 1973 0.43% 
Garcia and Pak 1979 0.63% 
Rose 1985 0.48% 
Gordon 1984 0.43% 
McAleer, Pagan and Volker 1985 0.31% 
Simpson and Porter 1980 0.52%-0.59% 
Cooley and Leroy 1981 2.80% 




Table 3 shows the definitions of L0, L1, L2 and L3. 
Table 3 
Definitions of Social Welfare Loss L 
L0 The social welfare loss with Woodford’s Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡 + 𝜑𝑔𝑔𝑡) built in. 
L1 The social welfare loss with the simple Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝜋𝑡) built in. 
L2 The social welfare loss with the simple (unobservable shocks) Taylor rule (𝑖𝑡 = 𝜑𝑥𝐸𝑡−1𝑥𝑡 + 𝜑𝜋𝐸𝑡−1𝜋𝑡) built in. 
L3 The social welfare loss with the combination policy rule built in. 
 
Here I show the relationship between 𝑏,𝛤 and The Improvement of L. 
Table 4 
The Relationship between 𝑏, Γ and L. 
b  Γ  The Improvement of L 
small  big  big 
big  big ( Γ  > b)  small 
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